Aftermath of the sinking of Blücher

Hi!

I've been looking around on the net about an answer to this question, but I have not found it:

How was the sinking of KMS Blücher announced in Germany?
How was the bad news accepted by the general publuic in Germany?

If I have understood it correctly, the soliders on board the ships in Unternehmen Weserübung was not allowed to write home about their whereabouts. So I suppose it was not generally known that a lot of german soliders were in Norway.
Does anyone know what effect the sinking had on the German public?

Links to further information would be apreciated.

Skarphol

My opinion si that contrary to what we have been thaught, the germans where quite honest regarding their losses, but not so honest when describing the awaiting revenge. I have newspapers from Norway from april 1945, where all german losses where mentioned, even described the losses as heavy and devastating, (this being the NS or nazi ruled press!) Of course they mentioned that the enemy would be repelled at the gates of Berlin, but I was amazed to see the honesty of the german loss reports in the cencored press.
Regarding your question, the loss of Blücher was of course mentioned, but as a calculated loss, afterall they was to take a whole country mostly by naval and air forces.
I think the loss of Blücher actually was a big surpise by everyone in Germany, especially the german high command and even the norwegians. The antique guns at oscarsborg was considered a threat, but I belive they feared the topredobatteries most.
Sorry I could not be more specific regarding Blücher, I have no links for the moment
Kurt

OK, thanks Kurt!

As you say, you don't have the whole picture regarding announcment of the sinking of Blücher.
The thing I am thinking about is that it must have been an enormous shock for the German public to learn that not only had they lost around a thousand men (or more likely around 700) but also invaded a country that most Germans considered quite friendly.
I wonder how people thought of those events when they happened.

Skarphol

I believe that upon the reception of the news, the German Admiralty responded with futility as the decision to deploy the Blücher not had been theirs initially. In fact, she had entered the Oslo-group as a trade. And it all began with the Lützow. Prior to Weserübung, Admiral Raeder had sought to deploy the Lützow in a raiding sortie in the Atlantic as part of his favourite strategy; diversionary action. Her role would have been similar to that of the Graf Spee, in which she were to tie up large amounts of enemy forces searching for her thus weakening the Home Fleet and facilitate German moves in the North Sea and off Norway. Hitler however did not approve to this strategy and decided that the Lützow would take part in Weserübung, which may have been due to Göring's critisism of the navy and its poor accomplishments. In a last attempt to free the Lützow for his planned Atlantic sortie, Admiral Raeder exchanged the newly commisioned heavy cruiser Blücher, still undegoing trials, with the Lützow. But the plan failed as Hitler came to welcome the Blücher but yet maintain the prospect of the Lützow participating in the campaign. She would become part of the Trondheim-group instead. The new addition to this group was poorly received by the Fleet Commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens, since the Lützow could put up a top speed of only 24 knots contrary to the rest of his ships, capable of 30 knots. Fortunant for Lütjens, a technical fault came to the rescue in the last minute and the Lützow was ordered back to the Oslo-group. She were to join them and then immediately return to Kiel for repairs before at last proceeding to the Atlantic.

This is how the events are portrayed in the book "Hitler's Naval War" by Cajus Bekker. Although it doesn't display the public reception of her sinking, it offers one very important note. Blücher should not have been there at all. Her demise occured simply because Raeder had a strategy that Hitler failed to play along with. One has to wonder why he had Admirals at all since they were deprived of the authority and freedom to make strategies. Anyway, seizing Norway was probably the single most important campaign of the Kriegsmarine and that may indicate just how they would represent the news as well. The ice-free harbour of Narvik and control of the entrance to the Baltic was beyond vital both for their naval operations and for their war industry and so forth, the loss of a cruiser could have been considered a payable price. I would not be surprised if the news of her sinking was justified by the importance of the mission. However, her sinking was avoidable and by itself represented a completely unneccesary loss, all owe to Admiral Kummetz. Despite multiple warnings, and intelligence that actually overestimated the Norwegian fortifications, he failed to draw the right conclusions. Signs that should convince any commander that he has lost the element of surprise occured prior to the engagement but it didn't seem to be a concern. Punctuality appear to be the basis of all his decisions. He had a time schedule and would not alter this despite the circumstances. That kind of information would never be reflected in public media.

Thanks for you thorough and informative answer, Terje!
It didn't enlighten me on the main aspect of my question, but it was very interresting to read.
I had no idea that Hitler was that involved in the planning for Weserübug. I though he at this phase of the war still had confidence in his generals and admirals.

Skarphol

Hitler was an army man which did not fully comprehend naval strategy, nor did he properly understand the purpose of a navy. His early impression of the navy may have been negatively coloured by the rebellious tendencies that surfaced amongst the navy men after the fleet had surrendered, 21 November 1918. For them, the humiliation was complete as they found themselves at the mercy of the Royal Navy without having been defeated in battle. They felt betrayed by their own leaders, something that culminated in The Grand Scuttle of the High Seas Fleet, 21 June 1919. Throughout the mid-war years, this event laid dormant but unsettled in the mind of Admiral Raeder. He desired to make up for the humiliation by restoring the fleet to its former glory, hence the Z-plan of 1938. But of the three branches, (Heer, Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine) the navy came out as the loser on the yearly budget. At the outbreak of war, the navy was nowhere near Raeders prospects. He wrote, two days after the invasion of Poland:

"In this war, which broke out some eight years before the point in time at which we could have built even 35% according to the fleet treaty of June 18, 1935 - in this war, the little bit that is finished or can be made ready for service, can only go down fighting honorably."

It did not require hindsight to draw this conclusion. The Germans were severely outnumbered and the only capital ships at disposal were the Twins, which mounted to practically nothing in light of the contemporary navies. Hitler would admire these capital ships for their sheer size and might but he did not understand that a navy's strength was set by its numerical size and not the size of its individual units. His naval perception were also frequently coloured by Göring, which of course spoke unfavourably of the navy to gain more economical attention towards the Luftwaffe. The internal quarrels between Göring and Raeder are perhaps most evident in view of the unfinished vessel, the Graf Zeppelin. While Raeder understood the potential derived from a coordination between the branches, Göring would hear none of it. Other times, Hitler would actually act on plain gossip. During a meeting in 1939 Raeder had presented Hitler the plans for their next battlehips, whereas Hitler critisized all aspects of the design. Seemingly, someone had been whispering negatively about these designs before the meeting took place. Raeders response was to ask for his own resignation as his decisions obviously wasn't good enough and upon this note, Hitler would suddenly turn. As a final authority Hitler was a moody fellow, shifting from enthusiastic and commited to arrogant and self-confident. Ultimately, he never had confidence in anyone but himself. And as the German success halted and then reversed, this became much more apparent. Some officers agreed with him, some chose to play along with him while others simply gave up.

Now, this isn't very related to the Blücher nor the Norwegian campaign but I felt that, after reading the last sentence of your post, a reply could be welcome. As far as the Kriegsmarine concerns, its always nice and sometimes also necessary to view the underlying intrigues and politics that constantly reshaped the role of the navy. Admiral Raeder had just about no tools to do the job that his navy was supposed to, yet he had to put up with an ignorant leader that demanded results and even told him how to do his job.

Hi again!

I'm amazed and impressed by the sheer volume of information you are in possesion of on this subject! And grateful that you take the time and effort to put it all down in a foreign language!
I've never really had any idea of most of these things earlier, just relatively brief knowledge of Plan Z, Graf Zeppelin, the scuttlilng of the High Seas fleet etc.

This thread has drifted a litle beside the original topic, and beside the purpose of this board too, but I guess the admins won't mind.

One thing that comes to mind while reading your last post is that the Luftwaffe may have received more resources than the Kriegsmarine did, but the Luftwaffe was far less sucsessfull in accomplishing their task than the Kriegsmarine ever was. I beleive that the Kriegsmarine fared quite well, given the resources they had.

Alf Øivind Skarphol

The navy, its men and its role is indeed a fascinating subject. Whether the Kriegsmarine did well is of course a question of which preferences you'd use to make such a statement. How could they for instance justify the deployment of a ship like the Gneisenau, with the logistic requirements of a battleship and a constructional cost of 146 174 000 Reichsmark, in a warfare of which a submarine were just as suited and way cheaper? With regards to purpose-building and threat analysis, ships of this size were over-qualified and ill-suited economically for the job. The value of the capital ships could perhaps only be measured by their naval successes, the sinking of HMS Glorious, 8 June 1940 and the HMS Hood, 24 May 1941. Only in these engagements did the ships earn their pay. I could add the Tirpitz to that equation as well since her use as a deterrent and the potential of a "fleet in being" came to its right with convoy PQ17. But that being said, Dönitz' wolfpacks still were the core of the Kriegsmarine and at the surface, the most successful ships actually were the Hilfkreuzers. The greatest dilemma with passing judgements on the performance of the navy would be that it was forced to wage its war on terms completely different from traditional. But they did held their record until the turn of the tide in the Atlantic in 1943. Göring had lost the battle of Britain long before.

In order to bring this thread back on topic, I'd point out that there might have been one that took the sinking of the Blücher heavier than any other. Kapitän sur Zee Heinrich Woldag went down with his plane only eight days after the sinking and his death is indeed a Cause Celèbre. It has occured more than once that there has been drawn a parallel between the sinking and his sudden death. Its very much based on conveniency, I'd presume but its not far-fetched either. It was his ship and thus he may have held himself personally responsible for the loss. But we will never know for sure. Why Admiral Kummetz would remain in his position and actually move on to command another disastrous sortie, Operation Regenbogen in late 1942, is perhaps an even greater mystery. Especially if the German Admiralty had requested an inquiry as to why the Blücher deliberately exposed herself to a threat of which she should be aware of. The commander of the Lützow, Kapitän sur Zee Georg Thiele, had proposed to Admiral Kummetz a high speed charge inwards the fjord as they decoded a Norwegian message to "douse all lights forthwith." His intention had obviously been to complete the run before the order was fully executed. The message implied two things: If the group continued regardless of the message, they would have to reduce speed to enable safe navigation thorugh the narrow waters thus exposing themselves more than desirable and more importantly, it meant that the Norwegians were quite aware that they were coming. Kummetz disregarded Thiele's proposal, apparently concerned with following his precious time schedule instead. What he did not take into account was that the schedule was based upon a discrete arrival. And if approached by the Norwegians, the German fleet were to transmit a trick message:

"Am putting in with permission of Norwegian Government. Escorting officer on board"

However, the intercepted Norwegian message should have indicated that even trick messages would get them nowhere. The Norwegians had been alerted and Kummetz now failed to adapt his operations accordingly. It was a major blunder.

A lot of information in this string, but here is how the Germans released the information back home.
The Wehrmacht had a press service - Abteilung für Wehrmachtpropaganda im Wehrmachtführungsstab des OKW.
From day one (1. sep 1939) they released a summing up of that days activities. This was broadcasted at midday. The message started with: "Der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt ..."
When special events occurred socalled Sondermeldungen were issued in addition to the normal daily message.

So to the messages of April 1940.
On tuesday April 9th the message was:
To counter the ongoing British attack on the neutrality of Denmark and Norway the German Wermacht has assumed the armed protection of these states. (Further on describing the advance, but not mentioning any loss apart from mentioning that only the Oslofjord defences had made any substantial defensive action, thus indicating there might have been casualties on the German side.)
On wednesday 10th:
... Our ship artillery brought heavy coastal batteries to silence in the Oslo approaches. During the fight with a 28 cm battery the cruiser Blücher was severely damaged. While advancing further on it struck a Norwegian mine field, and was lost after several mine hits.
In the same message the loss of the Karlsruhe was announced, without mentioning the cause.

Janef

Hi!

Thanks a lot, both Terje and Janef for your answers!

Terjes broad and insightfull post on the many decisions around Weserübung was great, and Janef hit the nail on the spot with the daily announcements from OKW!

I have allways wandered how they explained the attack on Norway for the home public.

The reason I started to think of this now, is the 4000 US soliders lost in Iraq during 5 years of fighting, and how that has been absorbed by the public in the States. The Germans lost around 1000 soliders the first day of a war in a country they didn't even know they were at war with, a country most people saw as fairly friendly. It must have been quite a shock.

Skarphol

I have the following informationn:
The marineartillerie knows about the sinking of the Blücher, but it was not official. (everybody tolk about)

I have heard about outers opinions. Therfore I need time to search for.

Greetings from Ulrich

Hello,
That is wat I know:

A marinesoldier remebers:

Während dieser Schulungszeit machten wir mit dem Zug einen Ausflug nach Oslo. Den Rückweg, oder einen Teil davon, machten wir zu Fuß. Kameraden im Zug sagten zu mir “guck da mal raus, da ist die Blücher untergegangen”. Der Ausbildungsleiter hat hiervon nichts erzählt, das Ereignis wurde totgeschwiegen. Im Reich wurde das nicht bekannt gegeben, es war geheime Kommandosache. (Anmerkung Verfasser: Laut e-mailberichte stimmt das nicht) Ich habe dies auch nicht weitererzählt. In der Marine war allerdings allgemein bekannt daß die Blücher vor Norwegen versenkt worden ist.

“Über die Versenkung der Blücher ist noch viel erzählt worden. Die war verschwunden. Das Schwesterschiff ist auch verschwunden. Die wurde vor dem Krieg verkauft, aber genau weiß ich das nicht. Über die Versenkung der Blücher haben haben mehrere Seeleute auf der Fahrt nach Deutschland debattiert. Die Matrosen saßen auf der Steuerbordseite. Die ersten Jahre hat man gar nicht darüber geredet, das war tabu.

Greetings from Ulrich

Hello Ulrich!
This is most interesting, but also a bit strange. The Germans also erected a memorial for Blücher, so it could not be that secret. See here: http://presentations.uib.no/pls/portal/NAFA.Z_INO_TAB_44_05.show
The dead were buried in a "Heldenfriedhof".
Of course the naval men knew that Blücher was sunk, but there were also lots of Army personell aboard, that survived.

One other curious fact: one company from His Majestys Guard actually captured and guarded most survivors, including the whole general staff (Falkenhorst & Co.). Instead of trasporting them away, the guards left after some hours, and left the captives. Surely the rest of the German operation would suffer a lot if these high ranking officers were out of game.

B.

Hello Björn,
Remembering is a difficult problem, see:
Dissertation Alltag für Soldaten, Kriegserinnerungen und soldatischer Alltag in der Varangerregion 1940 – 44 aus 2005 from Frau Ruth Weih-Sindt, Philoosophische Fakultät Kiel (I think I have got the information from nuav).

The marinesoldier has the same problems. The sinking of the Blücher was a great loss and can’t be hold secret. I don’t know when is was publik in german, but it was.

The soldier thought now (50 jears ago) it was secret. It don’t matter if it is true.

The soldiers in this time did’nt talk open about negatief things because of the repression of the Nazi-regime. It was a cultur of “Selbst-Zensur”. Also friends did't tell everything to each other. They think before they talk. In battlesituation it was maybee different. But I think "everything" the emotion include of the soldier was personal.

Many greeting from
Ulrich

Hello Ulrich!
I see your point. However, losses like the Admiral Blücher, or even all destroyers in Narvik could not be kept as a secret, and probably it was never tried to do so as well.
Germany, like many warstates today needed their heroes, and indeed got them.

Some historians have pointed out, that "living witnesses" are their true enemies. Of course it is easy to remember wrong.

Still you stated in a previous posting that "the marineartillery knew".. I hope you mean the norwegian ones?
And "it was not official". Yes it was.

Cheers,
Bjørn

Hello Björn,
Yes I agree.
I mean the german marineartillery in Norway knew….
Cheers
Ulrich

“Über die Versenkung der Blücher ist noch viel erzählt worden. Die war verschwunden. Das Schwesterschiff ist auch verschwunden"

The only operational sistership of the Blücher at that current time was the Admiral Hipper. The third cruiser, the Prinz Eugen, was moored at Krupp Germania shipyard in Kiel where she was fitting out. Likewise was the fourth and fifth of the heavy cruisers, the Seydlitz and the Lützow, moored at Deschimag shipyard (AG Weser) in Bremen at the time of Blücher's sinking. Those with a fairly good memory will at this point perhaps begin to wonder: - Wait a minute, didn't the Lützow sail in the wake of the Blücher 9 April..? Indeed a heavy cruiser named Lützow accompanied the Blücher. At the very same time, a heavy cruiser named Lützow were also moored at the shipyard in Bremen, as previously mentioned. Allow me to elaborate...

The first KM vessel to be named Lützow was actually a former light cruiser, born out of the London Naval agreement of 1935. The agreement had permitted Germany to build five heavy cruisers. At that time, the Kriegsmarine decided to build two of them as light cruisers. One of these was laid down at Deschimag shipyard in Bremen in August 1937. However, in December 1938 the Germans experienced a change of mind and decided to complete her as a heavy cruiser nonetheless. (The conversion was to be carried out as an extension of the current design and therefore not related to the Hipper-class) She would be launched in July 1939. Shortly after her launch, Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggresion pact and one of the consequenses of this pact was a Soviet desire to upgrade the fleet so as they could "cover their backs". By November, two months after the outbreak of war, the Soviets announced their interest in purchasing the Lützow whereas the Germans agreed to the transaction in February 1940. The Lützow was towed to Leningrad in April where she would receive the new name Petropavlosk. She was never to be completed.

The second KM vessel to wear the name Lützow was the Panzerschiff Deutschland, one of two raiders at large in the Atlantic at the outbreak of war. In the first days of November she sustained damage during a storm and was forced to return to Germany. Immediately after her arrival in Gotenhafen in mid-November, her war diary records the renaming of the ship from Deutschland to Lützow. The proposal of a name change came from Admiral Erich Raeder and was intended to a) conceal the fact that the ship were no longer at large in the Atlantic and b) to conceal that the other Lützow was to be transferred to the Soviet Navy but also c) avoiding the unfortunate effect on Allied propaganda if a ship named Deutschland were to be sunk.

As to be seen, for five months Germany actually had two heavy cruisers named Lützow. The original Lützow, towed to Leningrad and the Soviet Navy about a week after initiating Weserübung, had been smoothly replaced, both as ship type and name, by the Deutschland several months earlier.

Btw Bjørn, its not my intention to be prudish but Admiral Blücher is a very difficult combination for me. In descending order, Alfred von Tirpitz, Franz von Hipper, Reinhard Scheer and Maximillan Graf Spee were all naval officers and thus the vessels that carried their names could naturally also have the title Admiral. Blücher on the other hand was, as far as I know, an Army man. Only three KM ships ever used the title Admiral and they were all named after WWI commanders. (Graf Spee, Falklands 1914 - Hipper and Scheer, Jutland 1916)

Please let me know when I've overtried your interest in these matters. I tend to just ramble on and on...

Hello Terje
Yes I am very interested.

Your reseach makes that the information of the Soldier is no nonsense.

You wrote:
The sistership the soldier talk about was the Lützow. The Lützow was towed to Leningrad in April where she would receive the new name Petropavlosk.

Thanks and cheers from
Ulrich

Terje Langoy wrote:Please let me know when I've overtried your interest in these matters. I tend to just ramble on and on...

Even though you have left the topic of this thread, it is still very interresting to read! You can just ramble on...

Alf Øivind Skarphol

Hello Alf,
Yes, I am interestet in the Blücher, but it’s not so importend for me. My reaction was because I thougth the forum is interested in my information. I was surprised and glad to get the information from Treje.

My major item is Kirkenes and Petsamo.

Most importend for me now is the island Hovedøya / Oslo and the Marineartillerieschool in Rauöy. But I think nobody knows about it. I wil maybe later come bak with a question about Oslo.
Cheers from
Ulrich

Hi Ulrich!

I found your posts very interresting!

I saw your questions about Rauøy.
I was stationed there for a 5 week long course on a plethora of guns in 1990. We were shooting with everything the coastal artilllery had of handheld weapons, and then technical courses on the 15cm ex-german guns and the 75mm Bofors guns stationed there. Before that we had a week on the 128mm guns across the fjord on Bolærne.
That was a very nice course, we were only 6 pupils and 2 teachers. We just wore the uniform throusers and boots, and had at least one, often two, swimming-brakes during the days. That was 6 fantastic summer-weeks.
But I had no information to share with you about your qustion.

This has of course nothing to do with this thread...

Alf Øivind Skarphol

Hello Alf,
I believe, that your time on Rauöy was interesting. I have no militairy background because the army did not wanted me and I was glad about it.

I hope in the future to be able to visit Rauöy with vacation.

For the information about Rauöy I search for I think I have to look in the german archives.

cheers from
Ulrich

hi ulrich

rauøy was attacked by the germans after they first had shot at the germans as they where passing by with their ships.at first the germans got away in the fog,then came back and landed northeast of the fort but was cept down by effective shooting with røuøys 150 mm cannon nr.2,machinegunfire and riflefire.

Rauøy fought for about 2,5 hours and in that time they had fired 45 cannonshells and about 2500 heavy machingun rounds.
Røuøy surrendered after a order from Horten. this order was actually for the surrender of Karljohansvern so the order was on the wrong place!

The germans lost at least 60 men and the norwegians lost 2 men, Ragnar Kongsgaard and Harald S. Johansen.

Rauøy fort was also credited shooting down a german plane.

regards Atle M

Hello!
Ulrich: "the german marineartillery in Norway knew"
Why? There were none present at the time. :-)

B.

Hello Björn,
I don’t know the why and I don’t know the time. I gess 1942 / 1943.
Cheers from Ulrich

Hello!

I see, Ulrich!
At that time, most did know about Blucher.

Cheers,
Bjørn