Allied radio Norway campaign

Radio messages between Great Britain and Norway...

The admiralty station transmitted encrypted orders. Although these messages could not be solved, they provided clues to the most important debarkation ports of the British Expeditionary Force. In particular, they confirmed the landings near Harstadt, which had hitherto been merely a matter of conjecture.

The Germans intercepted the field messages of the British units which were advancing from the Andalsnes area by way of Dombas - Otta - Hamar to Lillehammer in the direction of Oslo. They used code names for their call signs and signatures. The messages themselves could not be solved. However, since the code names ware learned after a short time from captured documents, the chain of command and composition of units were soon clearly recognized and the enemy's movements were followed.





Every evening the Germans intercepted situation reports of the Norwegian High Command in Tromse, orders from the Admiralty in London, mine warnings, SOS calls, government radiograms to England and France, personal messages from King Haakon to King George of England and Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, and reports from the Reuter correspondents attached to Norwegian units.





the British ciphers could not be solved. Therefore, clear-text messages or code names and traffic analysis had to suffice as source material. The evaluation, therefore, was based chiefly on the procedural aspects of enemy radio operations.

Today it appears incomprehensible why the British seriously impaired the value of their well-disciplined radio organization and their excellent ciphers by transmitting call signs and signatures in the clear. Operating mistakes of this kind provided valuable information to the German intercept service

http://www.allworldwars.com/German-Radio-Intelligence-by-Albert-Praun.html

You omitted the conclusion:

The over-all results achieved by German radio intelligence during this campaign were quite modest and understandably so, in view of the shortage of equipment and personnel, which consisted of only one first lieutenant and twenty-four enlisted men. This is no way a reflection upon the quality of their work, however.

Your ignoring these important parts.


In particular, they confirmed the landings near Harstadt, which had hitherto been merely a matter of conjecture.



Operating mistakes of this kind provided valuable information to the German intercept service





The Germans intercepted the field messages of the British units which were advancing from the Andalsnes area by way of Dombas - Otta - Hamar to Lillehammer in the direction of Oslo.
the enemy's movements were followed.


What you selected was only the view of the writer, which based on what I just posted would seem very off the mark. In comparison to later allied Ultra work, it would be considered less comprehensive. Given what the limited materials & decoding abilities the Germans had on hand in north Norway, I'd say it was quite impressive.