German destroyers scuttled at Narvik.

Anyone know the names?

Empty of ammunition, the Germans scuttled all the ships and the crew escaped ashore to later join the German forces in Narvik.

http://www.battleguide.net/Narvik.htm

Black Hornet wrote:Anyone know the names?

Empty of ammunition, the Germans scuttled all the ships and the crew escaped ashore to later join the German forces in Narvik.

http://www.battleguide.net/Narvik.htm

A Norwegian patrol ship had sunk one of the refueling tankers en route to Narvik, this was the main reason why the German destroyers were caught and scuttled, not lack of ammumition. Some of the ship names are mentioned in various books I have read, Can't remember off hand but shouldn't be too hard to find out. The sailors were organised into 3 battalions armed from the Norwegian army depot. Some injured ones were sent into Sweden down the railway. This is covered on the Robert Martennson website, which is in the link section, great website.

Take a look at G Haarr's books on this as I think it will give you the answers you seek:

'The German Invasion of Norway' & 'The Battle for Norway'

Cheers

Bob

Harr's book is beginning to be the "Standardverk" - The Standard book about Norway April 1940

A great tribute to Harr

Ok, thanks. I'll get that book. The reality is a bit different to how British historians paint it, that the RN sank all 10 of the German Destroyers, when much credit goes to the Norwegians in reality, plus some were scuttled, not sunk. Not as romantic I suppose to the glorious RN defeat of the German navy sort of writing style. They lost badly at Norway, so a bit of artistic license to ease the pain perhaps is what is up with that.

They say the Germans never recovered from it, but in reality they gained forward bases to get to the Atlantic & were more active in Atlantic in 41-42 than they were in 39-40 in both surface ships & U-boats. One writer mentioned the fall of France negated the value of Norway because it gave even better Atlantic access, but he's wrong because German ships still needed to use Norway to GET to France. One couldn't just go through the channel.

The Destroyers did their job, & the crews were saved, & 10 new Destroyers were online the next year.

Geirr Haarr is Norwegian and not British, although I would welcome him as an honourary Englishman! The research he has carried out is impeccable. Yes, the British wrote inaccuracies in to their history, but then so have many other countires. Sometimes these inaccuracies are portrtayed in films and then accepted as the definitive history. Also, although I'm not quite sure who said it, possibly Churchill, but it is the victor who writes the history and his books are classic examples where the truth is distorted a little.

Haarr's work has taken him to many countries in his pursuit of the truth and it has taken many years to write. Parting the fog and confusion of battle, what he has written is about as accurate as one can get it; I commend his books to one and all.

Bob

[quote
The Destroyers did their job, & the crews were saved, & 10 new Destroyers were online the next year.[/quote]

Next year was not good enough. The lack of 10 destroyers and two cruiser tipped the scale as to invasion of UK the summer of 1940. In stead the Germans had to gamble for complete air superiority. This failed, and when the new destroyers was put into service, UK had rebuilt much of their strength after the big loss of weapons and ordnance at Dunquerque.

AltforNorge wrote:[quote
The lack of 10 destroyers and two cruiser tipped the scale as to invasion of UK the summer of 1940. In stead the Germans had to gamble for complete air superiority.

Is this a joke, or do you seriously mean this ?

Olve

They didn't have enough either way. If none of their warships were sunk, they still wouldn't have enough for Sealion. A moot point. They couldn't get rid of RAF besides, a doubly moot point.

The Germans could interdict British shipping in Atlantic on & below the surface better after taking Norway. & they did so. Taking England was never the main military interest for Germany as an asides.



I think these innacuracies we encounter is one of the main reasons some of us get into this sort of history. Yes every country does it. I saw a cat on tv say; the Merlin was the engine that beat the Germans, end quote in a documentary. 75% of the Luftwaffe was shot down over Russia, the larger portion due to anti aircraft guns, therefore one could argue it was Russian AA that was more responsible for the destruction of the Luftwaffe than any other factor.









P.S. If taking England were of interest to the Germans, then they would've built special craft for such an invasion in the 30's. MFP's, Siebel ferries etc for landing of flat beaches & so on. & these would be much more relevant to such an invasion than Destroyers would be. Plus they are cheaper to build & can be made in large numbers.

The Marinefährprahm (MFP) was the largest landing craft operated by Germany.
the first of these ships was commissioned on 16 April 1941 with approximately 700 being completed by the war's end in May 1945.

http://jazz.openfun.org/wiki/Marinef%C3%A4hrprahm

Ok, found the names. Looks like 8 were lost, not 10. & I've read they started the war with 21.

Kriegsmarine destroyer Diether von Roeder scuttled at Narvik

Kriegsmarine destroyer Hermann Kunne scuttled at Narvik

Kriegsmarine destroyer Wolfgang Zenker scuttled at Narvik

Kriegsmarine destroyer Bernd von Arnim scuttled at Narvik

http://books.stonebooks.com/record/1000135/




In Rombaksfjorden only four German destroyers remained. Bernd von Arnim and Wolfgang Zenker where out of ammunition and where run ashore and blown up by their own crews. Georg Thiele and Hans Lüdemann stayed and waited for the British destroyers. After a short battle Hans Lüdemann also ran out of ammunition and was ran ashore by the crew. While the crews from the 3 destroyers in Rombaksfjorden where trying to get them-selves ashore Georg Thiele tried to keep the five British destroyers away out in the fjord. Heavily damaged Georg Thiele fired their second to last torpedo (History says their last but this is incorrect) and hit HMS Eskimo who had its bow torn off. As the last destroyer Georg Thiele was also ran ashore at 15.00. Hans Lüdemann was still afloat and was torpedoed by HMS Hero. The remaining merchant ships where either torpedoed or had their bottom valves opened. Only a few ships where left afloat, among them was the German Tanker Jan Wellem which laid behind another ship and wasn’t sunk until the Germans occupied Narvik on April 28.


http://divenarvik.com/history.asp

'Alt for Norge' has a point. In the book, 'Destroyer - an Anthology of First-Hand Accounts of the War at Sea 1939-1945, - edited by Ian Hawkins, Conway Martime Press 2003, and supported by Len Deighton & Rear Admiral John Hervey, CB, OBE, RN, Retd., there is a quote which is of interest:

p57 Ramifications of Defeat

Anthologist's Note: The Allies retreated from Norway, but from that defeat a vital fact emerged. the German Navy had been damaged to such an extent that any immediate plans for the invasion of Britain had to be ruled out.

Well, if you want to invade England, you must have air superiority. Then you may launch an invasion armada by sea and air
The lack of some Zerstörers have very little influence in that matter. Any enemy counterattack by sea can be taken care off by airpower in these waters when you have air superiority.

Olve

In the quote the phrase 'immediate plans' was used and that is about right. At the tiime the Germans did not have naval superiority and it wasn't just down to a lack of Zerstörers lost at Narvik, although the loss was significant. As we know now the Germans could have never won the battle for air superiority over the UK - not just because of radar, but the way Fighter Command was structured to defend - historians recognise that this structure was vitally important to the winning of the battle. Therefore one could reasonably argue that the Germans had neither air or naval supremacy for invasion and if they had...

Kind regards

Bob

"the German Navy had been damaged to such an extent that any immediate plans for the invasion of Britain had to be ruled out."


Isn't true. If it were, why then did they go ahead & immediately plan for an invasion of England?, immediately following the conclusion of the Norway campaign? They threw in the towel when RAF didn't fall,( plus the loss of many barges again from RAF), it had nothing to do with Destroyers lost at Narvik.

Germans almost did win against RAF, they didn't concentrate on knocking out radar stations, ( They did hit a few, but the higher ups didn't allow their pilots to pursue it more aggressively). Then Goering switched to London bombing & also gave the order for 109's to fly slow to protect bombers taking their offensive power away.

But thats another thread.








Sperrle
> thought the Radar stations were still worth a try. So he
> detailed a small
> force, just 8 Stukas to have another go at Ventnor. The
> Stukes hit Ventnor
> with 22 bombs, and this time it was off the air for 7
> days. A Mobile
> reserve station was set up at Bembridge on the east
> of the island on the
> 23rd, but its performance remained very poor.

From the book The Most Dangerous Enemy. Page 222.

http://www.amazon.com/Most-Dangerous-Enemy-History-Britain/dp/1854108018

Once again, I refer to the term 'immediate plans'. The loss of craft at Narvik was not helpful to the German plans for the invasion of the UK - however, we know it wasn't just that particular loss as there were other factors including the fighter defence strategy.

The biggest fear in the UK was parachutists, but with the strength of the Royal Navy and of course the Germans inability to quell the RAF, the invasion was postponed. It makes you think that if they had tried then the defence screen around the invasion barges would have had to be massive, likewise with the attempts to parachute out of Ju 52s.

They had to assemble the invasion craft, fit em out with guns, put cement on the floors for ballast & to make em hard to sink, all of which takes time, therefore there was no immediate plan to invade. Preparations had to be made. Coastal guns set up along French coast, extra runways & so on.

The argument that Destroyer losses prevented an immediate invasion of England presupposes that these losses must be made up for, hence a 1941 invasion when these Destroyer losses were made good. This is not what occurred, they planned for a 1940 invasion regardless of Destroyer count.

We've always wondered why the Germans didn't follow up after Dunkirk - bearing in mind we were still in Norway...just. The Germans had Blitzkreiged their way across Europe and with the British Army on its knees the opportunity to invade was there. They faced us from Europe and from Norway. The defeat in France and Norway was costly - the Germans had captured many airfields and ports and could strike at us, yet there was a hesitation from the Germans. Agreed, the Germans had to destroy the RAF, but this battle began in August - by then we had more aircraft built and had recovered somewhat. By chance, do you think that the Royal Navy, the North Sea and the English Channel stood in the way of an early invasion?

I will finish this debate with the following quote taken from the personal memoirs of Admiral J H Godfrey:

'Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence Service, sent emissaries to London in early July, fearful of losing contact with the enemy of whom he wished to make an ally'.
Once such emisary was Lt Col Count von Schwerin who is quoted as saying - "Take Winston Churchill in to the Cabinet. Churchill is the only Englishman Hitler fears." Reference GBR/0014/GDFY Churchill Archives. It could be that there was more to the German hesitation to invade than what we know.

Yes the Channel & RN were big factors, but one must realize that even Norway wasn't part of Dolphos plans, ( Continental Europe was), until the Altmark incident which demonstrated the British were not going to respect Norwegian neutrality, hence the Swedish ore traffic wasn't safe, hence the decision to invade Norway.

As to RN, envision the Germans crossing at nite, landing on the beaches. RN then has a target to zero in on. Moving craft in water can zig-zag. Germans had plans to place 6 inch guns at Dover to deal with RN, but that's another thread. Sealion doesn't interest me so much.

Again, Hitler figured England could have its overseas empire, Germany would it's continental Europe empire. Just didn't quite work out like he thought, bogged in Russia.




As an asides, it was Admiral Wegener for the most part that was interested in taking Norway, Shetlands, & Iceland. He wrote about it in 1929 & got wide audience, but Raeder hated him & his ideas & did everthing he could to squish him. Wegener was looking to solve the WW 1 naval blockade problem. It's an interesting what if, but Hitler always said he was a coward on the sea & was obsessed with the Slavic menace in the east.

Wegener...

The complete dependence of British industry upon imported resources and the inability of agriculture to feed the nation had been well known long before the First World War. The obvious way to bring the imperial giant to its knees was to sever the maritime jugular.

Wegener set out his own vision of how the British could be attacked effectively: "Naval strategy is the science of geographic position ... with regard to trade routes." He declared that the only British traffic vulnerable to German interference was the Norway--Shetland Islands--Scotland route through the North Sea. In order to attain a geographic position of strategic relevance with respect to British mercantile shipping, he argued, it was necessary to mount a "northward strategic-offensive operation" that would change the geographic setting. He proposed expansion through Denmark and southwestern Norway and then over to the Shetland Islands "the Gate to the Atlantic."

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Raeder+versus+Wegener%3a+conflict+in+German+naval+strategy-a0138056199







Raeder, eventually head of the German navy, would direct officers under his command to write articles discrediting Wegener's work. He would also endeavor, unsuccessfully, to stop the publication of Wegener's book The Naval Strategy of the World War (Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges).


Wegener had vision, Raeder admitted he wanted to build big battleships like Bismarck & Tirpitz to get even with the British for WW 1 events. Not very intelligent strategically speaking. Donitz & Wegener were smarter.

& remember this... Had Germany taken England, it would then have to garrison it & feed the people, draining much needed men & resources away from a venture into Russia, Hitlers real goal.

G´day all

I read the previous post and felt a comment might be needed. I read the following...

Quote "Black Hornet"

"Wegener had vision, Raeder admitted he wanted to build big battleships like Bismarck & Tirpitz to get even with the British for WW 1 events. Not very intelligent strategically speaking. Donitz & Wegener were smarter."


Erich Raeder did indeed hold a different philosophy from Wolfgang Wegener but the statements above demonstrate a simplified interpretation on faulty terms therefore producing a flawed conclusion. Wegener based his theories on the experience gained while serving in the Hochsee Flotte; a thesis primarily highlighting geostrategical conditions and their correlation to the shaping of naval strategy. Norway was of considerable interest to Wegener because it offered bases ideal to counter a British blockade.

The years 1914-18 represented a naval front very different from the one in 1939-45, it also carried within a different ratio of strength in forces. The Imperial Fleet was a serious contender to the Royal Navy whereas the Kriegsmarine always would be vastly inferior.

Wegener´s thesis was of little use to Raeder some twenty years later. Instead he made a different approach by thinking of a global front for diversionary action - a naval guerilla war, largely based on his studies of WW I cruiser action from the mid-20´s. He would seek to disperse British forces all over the place to weaken their combined strength thus facilitating his own movements facing less opposition than potential. Not being decisive does not mean it was a bad strategy - it was the best he could do with the few ships he had.

The construction of big ships had little to do with restoring past glory and might, it mainly incorporated the rebuilding of a balanced fleet. It should also be kept in mind that the Anglo-German Fleet Treaty of June 1935 did not set the agreed 35 pr cent tonnage ratio as a pure “fleet ratio” - it was of course further divided into ship categories. This meant that 35 pr cent of British battleship tonnage could not be utilized by the Germans to build a carrier or twenty more submarines, it would have to be distributed into battleship tonnes. It served to dictate the appearance of the new German fleet and make sure the RN would be three times as strong regardless of ship type.


Best regards

Not true as regards big ships, Raeder admitted in his post war memoirs he built em to get even with British for WW 1.

http://www.learngermanwords.com/culture/war/erichraeder.html

Wegeners strategy was much better than Raeders prizefight which gains nothing. Better to gain bases of operation to better be able to strike into Atlantic sea lanes. His thinking was far superior to Raeders.

As was Donitz. A balanced fleet for Germany insured it would be weak in all areas. Z-plan was stupid. Much better to focus on U-boats & Pocket Battleships & Cruisers. Cheaper more effective weapons. Achieved much more than the huge battleships did.

Initially Raeder was against invading Norway, one of Germany's most successful military maneuvers of the war, both strategically & in its execution.


"The commander of the German Navy (Raeder) did not agree with his theory"!!





In 1929, Vice-Admiral Wegener had published a book (“The Sea Strategy of the World War”) that stated that Germany should seize Norway in a future war so that the German Navy of the future would have an easier time getting to the Atlantic. The commander of the German Navy (Raeder) did not agree with his theory but it did attract the attention and support of many other German naval officers.


Rather than seize Norway, Raeder wanted to rely on Norway remaining neutral in the war and the Allies respecting this neutrality.





& then what happened? Hitler finally got interested in Iceland, right in line with Wegener's Strategy. A bit late as regards pre-planning. If they'd worked on it, supply U-tankers could've been built, cargo ships with 6 or 8 inch guns fitted out aft for quick shore batteries & ships loaded with appropriate timber for runway construction as was done at Trondheim & so on.





Hitler ordered preliminary plans for Fall Ikarus in mid June of 1940. The troops projected to be used were the ones that were organized to relieve the Mountain Division at Narvik. Headquarters, 163rd Division was to be used with Mountain Troops (from 2nd Mountain, 4 battalions specially motorized), Motorcycle, Armor (one battalion of 13 Pz IIs and 34 Pz 38Ts), Mountain Artillery (12- 7.5 CM guns), Engineer troops (airfield construction, Port, and Line Companies), plus landing ferries. Four weeks provisions were to be carried.


Wegener was ahead of the pack, Raeder didn't even have any disguised merchant raiders fitted out at wars beginning. Was a year later when Atlantis sailed. So much for his pre-war planning. Goering was dumber, I will say that much.

G´day all

A late reply but I´ve been busy these days. I would like to start off with a response to the authentisity of this internet article...

http://www.learngermanwords.com/culture/war/erichraeder.html

Quote from article:

“In his memoirs, entitled Struggle for the sea, Raeder admitted that his real intention in building a formidable navy was to avenge the defeat of 1918 and bring England to her knees”

I have in my library Raeders memoirs (“Mein Leben”) where he speak of his efforts to reconcile with the Royal Navy in the mid-war years following his promotion. Germany could not become a major naval power but it was considered within reason she be restored as a secondary power along with navies such as France and Italy, this being the objective of Raeders reconstruction plans.

Quote from article:

“The Treaty prohibited submarines. He built them anyway”

Submarines were built abroad by German engineers years before Erich Raeder was promoted, this through a Dutch-registered company - NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, funded in 1922.

Quote from article:

“Battleships were to be no more than 10k tons so he redesignated them as pocket battleships and made them much heavier”

The basis sketch of the Deutschland was printed and signed by Admiral Zenker but political unrest and poor economy (they are indeed related) made sure construction could not begin before 1929. The new design was in slight but acceptable excess of the Versailles treaty (official 10k, actual 12k standard tons) designated simply as panzerschiff (armoured ship) by the Germans. It was dubbed pocket battleship in the international press after launch of the first vessel in 1931, the title created by naval analysts abroad trying to define the general characterstics of this new, innovative design.

The true value of these vessels came to its right not at sea but at a disarmament conference in Geneva 1932. The Deutschland had served to destabilize the balance at a time when fleets around the world were being formed through treaties. The Anglo German Naval Agreement of June 1935 was made very much due to a British desire to see a further construction of these vessels aborted in order to avoid a potential breakdown in international negotiations.

Quote from article:

“By November 1944, Raeder was no longer supreme commander of the German navy”

At that time Erich Raeder had already been out for some two years. The catalyst to his resignation came about with Cerberus in February 1942 when Hitler, against the advice of the naval staff, ordered the ships at Brest to withdraw. This brought an end to Raeders cruiser warfare in the Atlantic and with it also the end of him as the orchestrator of naval strategy. He resigned later this year, following the ill-fated Operation Regenbogen in the Barents Sea.


Moving on to other segments...


Quote Black Hornet:

“Wegener set out his own vision ... he declared the only British traffic vulnerable to German interference was the Norway--Shetland Islands--Scotland route through the North Sea.”

“In 1929, Vice-Admiral Wegener had published a book (“The Sea Strategy of the World War”) that stated that Germany should seize Norway in a future war so that the German Navy of the future would have an easier time getting to the Atlantic.“

These quotes are deliberately put in sequence so that hopefully an unfortunate contradiction may become apparent.

Let´s not forget the other nations, Germany being a major one of them, doing trade in the North Sea. If naval strategy is the science of geographic position ... with regards to trade routes, then Germany is extremely vulnerable to a blockade being formed in the Bergen---Shetland narrows, something the Royal navy of course figured out and put to effect with devastating results during World War One. For defensive purposes Wegeners theory of a Northern strike is indeed the correct strategy but it would not provide the German navy a better attack position before the Artic convoys were implemented.

It is further not true that Raeder opposed Operation Weser, something compounded by the accusations made towards him at the Nüremberg trials whereupon Raeder explained why the invasion had been a pure neccessity of war. He did not express any opposing opinions on the matter. The significance of Norway was brought forth already in September 1939 by Wilhelm Canaris and Rolf Carls addressing the matter before Raeder whom furthered their concerns during his meetings with Hitler. The question lay dormant until November when Soviet invaded Finland. Diplomatic propositions were made to land British troops in Norway and cross Sweden into Finland. This set the Kiruna iron ore trade at risk and with it vital supplies to the war industry. By the time Altmark was boarded Norway had been under the scope of German war planning for several months, the episode serving mainly to speed up the process.

All things considered Weserübung was a pre-emptive strike tied up in a defensive cause, acting on the notion that Great Britain was about to do the same thing. (See Plan R4 & Operation Wilfred)

If we are to flip the coin and look at the offensive aspects of Wegeners “naval strategy is the science of geographic position ... with regards to trade routes” the ideal naval base of attack will be found in Spain, more precisely Gibraltar. This base presents an open route to the Atlantic while being too far south for RAF bomber command; it provides control over the bottle neck of the the Mediterranean thus enabling Germany to stop the trade from British colonies in the far east transitting the Suez canal. They will also be able to aid their ally, the Regia Marina, in their campaign. I could mention that during Rommels desert campaign Raeder did take an interest in Dakar as a naval base of some potential.

Getting back to Norway as base of operations it does not deny the Royal Navy from gathering her strenght in Scapa Flow (the Home Fleet) which is an essential contributor to the headache of the inferior Kriegsmarine. They will not be able to strike into anything facing a patrol line so tight not even a duck can get past. To avoid accumulation of enemy forces in bottle necks such as the GIUK gap they must first be dispersed, something to be achieved by diversionary action ... as deduced by Raeder.

Quote Black Hornet

“Wegeners strategy was much better than Raeders prizefight which gains nothing.”

It should be defined what raider warfare is supposed to gain. Raeder was more than familiar with the impact and effects from it, having studied this in depth during the 1920´s. Essential observations did not just concern the sinking of merchants but also its effect on enemy naval resources. A successful raider is the one able to stay both on and below the enemy radar, requiring lots of attention without getting caught. When a raider is at large convoys are formed, this gives you an accumulation of targets and if your own forces are coordinated properly it gives you local superiority. (Wolf pack tactics) Convoys may need to be reinforced by larger escorts for appropriate protection, neutralizing their speed advantage and making them more vulnerable to torpedo attacks. Lots of cruisers will be reassigned into hunting groups to track down the raider, resulting in less cruisers being available for duties such as patrols in hi-risk areas. In essence a few manouvres over a large area stretches the enemy of his assets and resources...

Qute Black Hornet

“A balanced fleet for Germany insured it would be weak in all areas. Z-plan was stupid.”

Raeders long term fleet strategy estimated a 35 pr cent fleet to be completed around 1947. However war came upon him much sooner, which had him writing this note two days after Schleswig Holstein opened fire at Westerplatte:

"In this war, which broke out some eight years before the point in time at which we could have built even 35% according to the fleet treaty of June 18, 1935 - in this war, the little bit that is finished or can be made ready for service, can only go down fighting honorably."

To be noted Hitler ordered the Z plan in effect January 1939 (estimated completion by 1944) and then he moved on to denounce the Anglo German naval treaty three months later. However the above memo tell us about Raeders reconstruction plans in September 1939, it shows he still calculated his fleet reconstruction using figures from the Anglo German naval treaty, both fleet size and completion time estimate. The A.G.N.A. would have permitted the construction of two, possibly three more battleships (dependent upon progress of the King George V class) - this being less than half the fleet projected in the Z plan. I think we can state, with some certainty, Z plan being one of Hitlers castles in the clouds rather than Raeders more realistic approach to a reconstruction plan. It was indeed stupid.

Quote Black Hornet

"Much better to focus on U-boats & Pocket Battleships & Cruisers. Cheaper more effective weapons.”

If we focus on the types of ships you mention there is one very important benefit gone. First out, say Germany decide to continue their early plans, the Ersatz Programme, for a fleet of six panzerschiff - this mean you can practically forget the Anglo German naval treaty. It is not gonna happen as long as these vessels emerge from the yards. Meanwhile you run the risk of intervention if the Deutschland class becomes too much of a nuissance for the major naval powers. Furthermore all of your submarine construction must be done illegally, on contract from navies such as Finland, Turkey and Soviet. At the end of the day your naval inventory remains empty, as dictated by the Versailles treaty. All of your cruisers are limited to 6k tons, this mounting to a couple of light cruisers at best. Service records on these ships in World War Two does not make an interesting read.

Quote Black Hornet

“Raeder didn't even have any disguised merchant raiders fitted out at wars beginning ... So much for his pre-war planning.”

Disguised merchant raiders are not part of the typical inventory in a navy. They are supplementary units converted in a jiffy if circumstances call for quick-fix-solutions. It is a token of a rather ill-prepared navy the one dependent upon merchant vessels to be converted for naval duties.

Further I would like to recite a memo Raeder made shortly after Gneisenau returned to Kiel late July 1939, concluding her six-week cruise in the central Atlantic:

“In any but the most peaceful times, no warship ever leaves home waters without full war-readiness magazines, and if I had apprehensions of war, I would have never permitted her to sail unprepared. Neither the Commander of the Battleships Division nor the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet expressed to me any concern on the matter.”

It seems any statement to the effect that German pre-war planning was lousy merely serve to show an essential piece of information has been lost in translation. During summer of 1939 the naval staff had no apprehensions of war being imminent. It was Chamberlain to declare war, not Hitler.

the ideal naval base of attack will be found in Spain, more precisely Gibraltar

Yes, & to get to either French or Spanish ports, one still needs Norway. I'll agree the southern strategy,( which includes Operation Felix), is better than Barbarossa.



Disguised merchant raiders.

In any but the most peaceful times, no warship ever leaves home waters without full war-readiness magazines,

Indeed. No one inferred otherwise. Graf Spee did exactly that because unlike the Merchant raiders, she was set up for operation ahead of time.




Disguised merchant raiders are not part of the typical inventory in a navy.


Not true, they were common in German navy in WW 1. No reason it would be different in WW 2.










Furthermore all of your submarine construction must be done illegally, on contract from navies such as Finland, Turkey and Soviet. At the end of the day your naval inventory remains empty, as dictated by the Versailles treaty


Hitler repudiated treaty of Versailles in 35, leaves 5 years to ramp up U-boat production. Pocket battleships laid down in 32. Dunno what the cruiser comment above is about.

" but it would not provide the German navy a better attack position before the Artic convoys were implemented."

It is further not true that Raeder opposed Operation Weser, something compounded by the accusations made towards him at the Nüremberg trials whereupon Raeder explained why the invasion had been a pure neccessity of war. He did not express any opposing opinions on the matter.



Yes it did provide Germany a better attack position before the Arctic convoys. Enabled Scharnhorst, Gneisenau & Bismarck & other Germans ships easier access to Atlantic.

It is true Raeder opposed Norway occupation prior to Altmark incident, he said it himself, a pure necessity of war, ( to protect ore traffic). He was verbally against Wegeners strategy of occupation prior to this. Hence his vision wasn't as good.



& Hitler declared war before Chamberlain. Both France & Britain had pacts with Poland.

G´day all


“...to get to either French or Spanish ports, one still needs Norway.”

For the sake of enlightenment it would be great if you could define exactly what makes Norway so important rather than for me to repeat the contents of my previous posts.


“In any but the most peaceful times, no warship ever leaves home waters without full war-readiness magazines,

“Indeed. No one inferred otherwise.”

Nor did I state anything to the effect it had been inferred. Why you extract parts of a historical quote, isolate it from its context and then reply on it is a mystery only you can answer.

“Graf Spee did exactly that because unlike the Merchant raiders, she was set up for operation ahead of time.”

Graf Spee had been in service for several years before the outbreak of war. An operative warship does not require much time to be prepared for action, nor do she need to be converted before deployment. She is built for war, merchants are not.

“Disguised merchant raiders are not part of the typical inventory in a navy.”

“Not true, they were common in German navy in WW 1. No reason it would be different in WW 2.”

For the sake of clarity I will repeat myself on this one.

“They are supplementary units converted in a jiffy if circumstances call for quick-fix-solutions”.

In this case circumstances translates as ... war. In peacetime navies don´t build merchant raiders. They are so forth not typical inventory.

“Hitler repudiated treaty of Versailles in 35, leaves 5 years to ramp up U-boat production.”

It was Ribbentropp to negotiate forth the Anglo German naval treaty making the Versailles treaty obsolete. Germany was then permitted to build a 45 pr cent submarine fleet in accordance with new treaty regulations. Great Britain did however not have a lot of submarines.

“He was verbally against Wegeners strategy of occupation prior to this. Hence his vision wasn't as good.”

Am I to believe Raeders vision wasn´t as good as Wegeners because he initially was verbally against an occupation of Norway?

45 pr cent submarine fleet in accordance with new treaty regulations. Great Britain did however not have a lot of submarines.

Germany was not exactly in the habit of keeping within the parameters of any of these agreements.


As to Raeder, yes, partially that, but also building giant battleships cause he wanted revenge on British navy for WW 1, something he mentioned in post war memoirs.

He was a surface fleet man & the U-boat was Germanys most potent weapon. I just don't think he had it going on as they say. Donitz & Wegener as had more innovative & strategically profitable ideas.



Peacetime navies don't build merchant raiders. Most don't, but you can't compare other navies to Germany's They & Japan were mainly the ones that used these. & Germany WAS preparing for war, not for peacetime. They learned the value of these ships in WW 1, therefore there is no practical reason why some of these shouldn't be fitted out. They are much less expensive than warships are. Germany had cargo ships all over the world when the war began, none of em fitted out for such. Not good show in my view. 6 p's Previous planning prevents piss poor performance.

A bit on these raiders & remember, their performance capability was well known from the previous war.


There were nine other warships, which, between them, accounted for 142 ships sunk or captured, grossing more than 870.000 tons, in a total of 3.769 days at sea, an average of more than 230 tons of enemy ships sunk or captured per day.

If this operational record is impressive, then in economic terms, the figures are even more so, as this outstanding performance was achieved by little more than 3,000 officers and men, in nine second-hand freighters, armed with third-hand weapons, the total cost of which, both in terms of purchase price and the cost of fitting out, represented barely 1% of the cost of the battleship Bismarck!

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/hilfskreuzer/hilfskreuzer_introduction.html







Another interesting bit along these lines...

From the Affidavit of Vice Admiral Lohmann (not to be confused with the infamous Captain Lohmann): Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build eight armored ships. Germany, however, built only three armored ships, the Deutschland, the Admiral Scheer, and the Graf Spree .... Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build eight cruisers. Germany, however, built only six cruisers .... Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build 32 destroyers and/or torpedo boats. Germany, however, built only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats.

http://ldfb.tripod.com/r01.html

G´day all


“Retrospective scrutiny dilutes the flavour of contemporary analysis...”

This quote is from the book The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany 1933 - 39, A Study in Appeasement by the author Joseph Maiolo. It appears to me a quote of relevance to this thread.

Even scholars to study the mid-wars era are in conflict as to the reconstruction of the Kriegsmarine and the British policy of appeasement. Eva Harazti holds an opposing view to Maiolo in her book Treaty Breaker or Realpolitiker where its argued the treaties failed to execute diplomatic armaments control, the idea of international Qualititative Limitation being bound to collide with national interests.

It should be noted the Anglo German naval treaty was a mutual agreement of Qualititative Limitation made at a time other nations broke out, nations such as Italy and Japan. (Second London Conference) It therefore must be viewed in this wider, global context rather than as an isolated event. It should at the same time, from a German position, be seen as an acceptance of their claim made at the Geneva conference in 1932, their demand for equality of rights.

It needs to be specified what is meant by the statement Germany was not in the habit of adhering to parametres of the treaties. There are two of them, the Versailles and the Anglo German naval treaty. Though these treaties were circumvented by events like the establishment of NV - Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, there are however nothing to suggest a massive submarine construction program could be initiated. A fleet of submarines serves not only to provoke an international reaction and spell out in clear text the future intentions of the Kriegsmarine (submarines makes a lousy tool for protection of commerce trade) it also ensure the Royal Navy pay proportionally more attention to the development of anti-submarine technology and tactics in the years to come.

A study made by Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy Plans Division, prior to the making of the Anglo German naval treaty, addressed the alternative configurations the reconstruction of the Kriegsmarine could take. It concluded the most threatening form it could take would be a fleet consisting of panzerschiffe, cruisers and submarines, a fleet of cruiser war potential. The study also found the least threatening form would be a balanced fleet that reflected the form of the Royal Navy. Kings study is essential to the preliminary conditions of the treaty and serve to illustrate that not only was Raeders balanced fleet very much in adherence to the treaty (the British deliberately steered him in that direction) but also that the Royal Navy were early aware the potential threat from the alternative fleet suggested built above in this thread.

Every action has its reaction ... do you think the Royal Navy would be sittin´ at the fence for five years while the Kriegsmarine sets out to build that fleet ..?


It is with a great deal of sceptisism I note the repeated claim of Raeder seeking revenge on the Royal Navy, especially since his memoirs (Mein Leben) speak of the opposite. I have in my library that book. It is further even more interesting the info I found at this site...

http://openlibrary.org/books/OL16558599M/Struggle_for_the_sea

...that the very memoirs being referred to here (Struggle for the Sea) according to its Edition Notes is an english translation of Mein Leben, Schlichtenmayer 1956. Be this the case and I dare say you´re full of BS. I would like to quote an Amercian fellow named Christopher Hitchens:

“That which can be asserted without evidence can also be dissmissed without evidence”

...this being a modern adaption of the latin phrase: “Affirmanti Incumbit Probatio” (The burden of proof is upon he who affirms) - claims have been made that Raeder sought revenge yet there is nothing to substantiate it.

It has further been stated Raeders vision was not as good as Wegeners because he allegedly opposed an invasion of Norway, this not vigorously but initially and in a verbal fashion. Usually I don´t put much credit in Wikipedia but their article on Erich Raeder did nonetheless make an interesting read...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Raeder

...the section below subtitle World War Two contains a couple of notes worth attention. For the record I have absolutely no problem with those to prefer Wegener but there is no need to fabricate allegations against Raeder in order to advocate Wegener.

The construction of battleships apparently was a poor reconstruction strategy. I suppose this prove Raeder was but a vindictive surface fleet man unwilling (or perhaps unable) to pursue a Jeune Ècole reconstruction strategy and make plans for a future Guerre de Course upon an anticipated enemy, a role apparently to be played by the most disproportionate navy around, the Royal Navy. Ambitions is a nice thing but this is not even close to a realistic approach, it is delusions of grandeur.


The response provided on the issue of merchant raiders contain some rather interesting aspects.

“Peacetime navies don´t build merchant raiders ... Most don´t but you can´t compare other navies with the German one. Kriegsmarine and the Imperial Japanese fleet were mainly the ones to deploy these.”

The Kriegsmarine was conceived a traditional navy and she is constantly subject to comparison. It is the pursued strategy of Sea Denial, as opposed to the more conventional strategy of Sea Control, to make the German navy present itself as the “Odd-One-Out”. Her fleet was comparable to other fleets, such as the Marine Nationale and Regia Marina.

There is little to advocate the establishment of merchant raiders in times of peace, not in Germany nor anywhere else. Such ships are born purely in times of need, not otherwise. They might appear to have been successful weapons in the German arsenal but a merchant not carrying goods in peacetime is just bad for business.

“The Germans learned the value of merchant raiders in World War One ... there is no practical reason why some of them should not be fitted out.”

The concept of armed merchants dates back to the age of the sail. In such a sense there is a certain symbolic found in the fact one of Germanys most famous merchant raiders, the Seeadler, was a sailing ship. This kind of supplementary units served in all the fighting navies, in both defensive and offensive capacities, during World War One and Two.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_merchantman

And I suspect you now will be thinking that ...well, they should at least have fitted out some merchant raiders as part of a pre-war plan. This presume Raeder had knowledge of war being at the door step, something I have already pointed out (and supported by quoting him directly) ... he did not. It should once again be noted that Raeder estimated the completion of his fleet to be reached in 1947 - serving to illustrate a potential pre-war planning process lay several years ahead of him when war broke out.

“Germany WAS preparing for war”

It has been stated, and apparently emphasized by the use of Capped letters, Germany was preparing for war. I suppose the restoration of military forces may be interpreted as such but it ought to be a point worth to consider where the nation is coming from. Germany was after all stripped of territories and military power after World War One thus one could argue the restoration of a fleet not neccessarily is synonymous with preparations for war. Recent events such as the Munich Agreement (Sudetenland) and Anschluss (Austria) suggest the catalyst to war originates from a set of territorial questions rather than military preparations. It should also be mentioned the recapture of alleged German territory formed parts of a continental policy thus the state-of-readiness in the Kriegsmarine makes practically no difference to the matter. However this subject have strayed far from the initial contents of this thread thus I will comment no further on it.

Returning to the first point of your latest reply, where once again the merchant raiders are presented as the most potent surface weapon of the Kriegsmarine.

“There were nine other merchant raiders which between them accounted for 142 ships sunk or captured, in total some 870 000 tons.”

And if we sum up the achievements of the heavy cruisers and battleships then we get ... let me see, some 93 ships, this including an aircraft carrier and a battlecruiser. 24 of these victims were from the ill-fated convoy PQ 17, sunk at the mere rumour of Tirpitz leaving port, (a text-book example on the principle of a Fleet in Being, a vital aspect of Sea Denial) another strategic bonus to be achieved by the sortie of the Admiral Scheer was to force the British Admiralty into deploying larger escorts for the convoys, resulting in significant implications to other commitments in the Royal Navy.

You should be careful not to underestimate the importance of the warships to act as deterrents upon enemy forces, especially since this serve to facilitate the movements of a merchant raider while facing far less opposition than potential. You suggest to drop these deterrents permitting the Royal Navy to allocate more resources to hunt down the merchant raiders. Basically you are shooting at your own foot.

“If the operational record is impressive, then in economic terms ... the total cost of which, both in terms of purchase and fitting out, represent barely one pr cent the cost of the Bismarck”

I sincerely doubt convoy PQ 17 would scatter because the Atlantis was rumoured to be leaving port. I do not believe that Churchill would ever utter the phrase: Sink the Penguin! nor do I think a convoy encountered by the Stier would bring forth a need to reinforce convoy escorts using battleships. I do find it likely a cruiser deployed to hunt down S & G, Scheer etc. would represent a great threat to a merchant raider if it was to be deployed here rather than chasing an elusive enemy warship. There is a certain symbiosis at play here. Previously in this thread I wrote about the different aspects of the raider acting as a tool for Sea Denial but this obviously was a complete waste of time.

Further on to the next point where I once again resort to the dubious wiki-site, addressing the terms specified in the Versailles treaty.

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles/Part_V

And continue with the following statement:

“Germany was permitted to build eight armoured ships ... only three were built”

According to Part V Section II Article 181 of the treaty that figure should be six, not eight. From Article 190 we also find that Germany was permitted to replace her Linienschiff only after their service period had passed twenty years and that replacement designs would then be limited to 10 000 ton displacement. During spring of 1934 the replacement units already built or under construction in the Kriegsmarine were as following:

Ersatz Preussen - launched as the panzerschiff Deutschland
Ersatz Lothringen - launched as the panzerschiff Admiral Scheer
Ersatz Braunschweig - launched as the panzerschiff Admiral Graf Spee

Ersatz Elsass - later revised and launched as battleship Scharnhorst
Ersatz Hessen - later revised and launched as battleship Gneisenau

This makes for five out of six units, in full accordance to the Ersatz Programme of November 1932, rather than the above suggested three out of eight units. If we choose to completely ignore the signing of the Anglo German naval treaty in June 1935 and its impact on German reconstruction plans then yes ... you do make a point.

“Germany was permitted to build eight cruisers ... only six were built.”

Once again I refer to Part V Section II Article 181 to state that six, not eight, cruisers were permitted into the Reichsmarine. And if we account for Article 190 here as well then we are speaking about six cruisers whose replacement designs are restricted to 6000 ton, bound to the same service expiration paragraph. Germany did replace her six light cruisers, all of them practically useless for cruiser war in the Atlantic.

If we choose to completely ignore the signing of the Anglo German naval treaty in June 1935 and its impact on German reconstruction plans then yes ... you do make a point.

Twas Admiral Lohman's quote, not mine.





“...to get to either French or Spanish ports, one still needs Norway.”

For the sake of enlightenment it would be great if you could define exactly what makes Norway so important rather than for me to repeat the contents of my previous posts.


Air cover from Norways south coast for 1. Ports to refuel for outbound voyage. Less distance to Atlantic compared to German ports. Easier to work in tandem with U-boats for part of the voyage. If weather gets bad, they can sail back to a Fjord to safety. If damaged by British planes or ships, they can turn back to again to safety. Get air cover on the way in.










I sincerely doubt convoy PQ 17 would scatter because the Atlantis was rumoured to be leaving port. I do not believe that Churchill would ever utter the phrase: Sink the Penguin! nor do I think a convoy encountered by the Stier would bring forth a need to reinforce convoy escorts using battleships.

Agreed, never stated otherwise. the original point was none were fitted out, not that they should replace Battleships & Cruisers.

convoy PQ 17, sunk at the mere rumour of Tirpitz leaving port,

Actually sunk by Luftwaffe & some by U-boats,( sighted & tracked also). As to the order to scatter, a major boof on the part of the Admiralty is all.


Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief Admiral Raeder stated, "...our submarines and aircraft, which totally destroyed the last convoy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17




P.S. Now that we've made each others respective X-mas lists Terje, perhaps its time to make a wish list to PM each other. A new Bentley, midnite blue with Camel interior perhaps, Fokker Tripane half scale. I'll have to work on it.

& I don't suppose one needs super battleships to perform 'Cruiser' warfare.


Interesting comparison, 1st quarter of 41. Surface raiders vs U-boats. Arguably the surface raiders best period.

In December 1940, German raiders Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper put to sea. These warships, together with the two battlecruisers that sortied during the first quarter of 1941, evaded British patrols and sank 47 Allied merchant ships. These actions disrupted British convoy defenses and severely dislocated the flow of shipping across the Atlantic. German U-boats took advantage of the confusion and sank another 138 merchant ships over the same four-month period.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/de-kriegsmarine-commerce.htm

A Norwegian patrol ship had sunk one of the refueling tankers en route to Narvik, this was the main reason why the German destroyers were caught and scuttled, not lack of ammumition.

The Jan Wellem had actually oiled three of the destoyers; the 1934 and 1934As only carried enough main gun ammunition in their magazines for seven minutes' continuous fire - 120 rounds per 127mm gun...compared to 200 rounds (later 250) in the opposing RN destroyers.

The reality is a bit different to how British historians paint it, that the RN sank all 10 of the German Destroyers, when much credit goes to the Norwegians in reality, plus some were scuttled, not sunk. Not as romantic I suppose to the glorious RN defeat of the German navy sort of writing style. They lost badly at Norway, so a bit of artistic license to ease the pain perhaps is what is up with that.

I'd like you to prove that claim, that British historians claim all ten were scuttled.

One writer mentioned the fall of France negated the value of Norway because it gave even better Atlantic access, but he's wrong because German ships still needed to use Norway to GET to France. One couldn't just go through the channel.

Fast German convoys DID frequently transit the Channel by night...close to the French/Belgian coast, inshore of German minefields.

How do you think the flak barges, e-boats, s-boats etc. in the lower Channel and French Atlantic ports GOT there???? They certainly didn't sail via Norway and out into the Atlantic and around Ireland!!!

The Germans could interdict British shipping in Atlantic on & below the surface better after taking Norway. & they did so.

No, they attempted to do so, they never fully succeeded.

I think these innacuracies we encounter is one of the main reasons some of us get into this sort of history. Yes every country does it. I saw a cat on tv say; the Merlin was the engine that beat the Germans, end quote in a documentary.

A documentary on what, exactly?

P.S. If taking England were of interest to the Germans, then they would've built special craft for such an invasion in the 30's. MFP's, Siebel ferries etc for landing of flat beaches & so on. & these would be much more relevant to such an invasion than Destroyers would be. Plus they are cheaper to build & can be made in large numbers.

The Marinefährprahm (MFP) was the largest landing craft operated by Germany.
the first of these ships was commissioned on 16 April 1941 with approximately 700 being completed by the war's end in May 1945.

Noone in Germany, let alone Hitler, expected to be on the French shore of the Channel as of the 1930s...that's why they didn't embark on building amphibious landing ships early enough.

& remember this... Had Germany taken England, it would then have to garrison it & feed the people, draining much needed men & resources away from a venture into Russia, Hitlers real goal

Remember this - German plans for the conquest of England included the forced transfer of the male population of Britain from 17-50 to the Continent as forced labour. Fewer mouths to feed, and certainly noone left that would require a large garrison.

cargo ships with 6 or 8 inch guns fitted out aft for quick shore batteries

Only for direct, observed fire - they would have been hopeless for indirect fire in support of foces further ashore.

& ships loaded with appropriate timber for runway construction as was done at Trondheim & so on.

Perhaps you should look better at the history of RAF Kaldadarnes to see what exactly was required to build an airfield in Iceland...

Yes, & to get to either French or Spanish ports, one still needs Norway.

And how many German vessels got through the RNPS North Sea Picket, the RN Destroyer Picket, RAF/Coastal Command air recce, and the Home Fleet guarding the GIUK Gap....?

Hitler repudiated treaty of Versailles in 35, leaves 5 years to ramp up U-boat production.

....but didn't repudiate the AGNA until 1937...

Yes it did provide Germany a better attack position before the Arctic convoys.

The prospect of British convoys of aid to the USSR as of June 20th 1941 was hardly a concern in April 1940...

Germany was not exactly in the habit of keeping within the parameters of any of these agreements

It kept to the AGNA until 1937.

Germany had cargo ships all over the world when the war began, none of em fitted out for such. Not good show in my view. 6 p's Previous planning prevents piss poor performance..

Might this have had something to do with the fact that German cargo ships were carrying cargo all over the world when the war began?

Cargo ships can carry cargo "and" Guns as it happens. & Bob, never said Haar was British.

Sea Picket sucked ass, hardly sunk a thing in early war phase.



Quote;
The prospect of British convoys of aid to the USSR as of June 20th 1941 was hardly a concern in April 1940...

No shit.

Quote;
No, they attempted to do so, they never fully succeeded.

No shit. They did largely succeed for a time however, & it was relevant to the conduct of the war as regards supply for Brits. The point is, lack of Norway reduces they're odds of success, hence it was a valueable piece of real estate & worth taking.

Yes fast small convoys navigated the channel, very few large warships or cargo ships did. Null point.

British claim of sunk, ( not scuttled), German Destroyers. Claim backed up.

a British naval counter-attack by the old battleship HMS Warspite and a flotilla of destroyers over several days succeeded in sinking all ten German destroyers once they ran out of fuel and ammunition.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Weser%C3%BCbung


http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2492777/posts


As to not thinking of being at French coast in 1940 & MFP's, irrelevant, Norway & Black sea & Baltic were considered as potential landing sites well ahead of 1940. These same MFP's were then deplyed in Baltic during Barbarossa. & yes Norway had flat landing beaches in the southern part of the country.

http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=Norway+beaches+Oslo&view=detail&id=93C35D9CAF3585F8110F77E299F7393CB02FA812&first=0&qpvt=Norway+beaches+Oslo&FORM=IDFRIR












& ships loaded with appropriate timber for runway construction as was done at Trondheim & so on.

Perhaps you should look better at the history of RAF Kaldadarnes to see what exactly was required to build an airfield in Iceland...



Entirely familiar, there was a functional gravel runway at Melgerdes, & another British built & functional one there by August 1940. Today there are 90 runways there, 70 of them grass. Plus the runway at Trodheim was completed in 3 weeks. You should read up on it.

The Germans forces started improving the airport, helped by thousands of Norwegian workers, within weeks having built a new runway
http://www.airports-worldwide.com/norway/trondheim_vaernes_norway.php

JU 52s landed on grass all the time, Stukas also.

Aug 1940.

This was followed by the Fairey Battles of No.98 Squadron Bomber Command....to operate from the makeshift grass field at Kaldadarnes...


On account of the Battles’ limited range the squadron was held up at Wick several weeks awaiting favourable weather for the crossing to Iceland and it was not until 27 August that the first section of 9 Battles led by W/Cdr. Ashton in L5343 took off for Iceland escorted by two Sunderlands. Five hours and twenty minutes later they all landed safely at Kaldadarnes, L5343 thereby allegedly becoming the first RAF aircraft to set its wheels on Icelandic soil.


on the 1st of DECEMBER...three months later..."Airfields were still under construction at Reykjavik and Kaldadarnes






...on the 15th of January 1942 -
Weather very stormy. Worst hurricane since 1925. SE wind speed 135 mph. Five USN flying boats sunk at Skerjafjörður. No aircraft or Nissen huts damaged at Kaldaðarnes.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=164228

Again, no aircraft or huts damaged at Kaldaðarnes. Worst storm since 1925.



























And where do the men for airfield construction come from right?

Hitler ordered preliminary plans for Fall Ikarus in mid June of 1940. The troops projected to be used were the ones that were organized to relieve the Mountain Division at Narvik. Headquarters, 163rd Division was to be used with Mountain Troops (from 2nd Mountain, 4 battalions specially motorized), Motorcycle, Armor (one battalion of 13 Pz IIs and 34 Pz 38Ts), Mountain Artillery (12- 7.5 CM guns), Engineer troops (airfield construction, Port, and Line Companies), plus landing ferries. Four weeks provisions were to be carried.


JU 52
If the landing was on grass,
it would have easily stopped in
less than 1,000 feet. Just what the book says.”
www.warbirds-eaa.org/featured/4Featured%20Articles%20-%20Vol.%2026,%20No.%2008-%20Dec...

Sea Picket sucked ass, hardly sunk a thing in early war phase

Would that have been the period when there WAS nothing German there to sink?

The prospect of British convoys of aid to the USSR as of June 20th 1941 was hardly a concern in April 1940...

No shit.

I'll regard that as you accepting that the chance to interdict British convoys to the USSR in 1941 WASN'T a concern of the Weserubung planners in 1940.

There ARE more polite way of admitting you're wrong...

No, they attempted to do so, they never fully succeeded.

No shit. They did largely succeed for a time however, & it was relevant to the conduct of the war as regards supply for Brits.

They did NOT largely succeed for a time. The British through 1941 were greatly concerned about the loss of tonnage and their capacity to keep moving cargos across the Atlantic at the rate they were doing - but they DID manage to do so in the end.

The point is, lack of Norway reduces they're odds of success, hence it was a valueable piece of real estate & worth taking

Norway as a checkmate on the Atlantic traffic is a non-starter - what it DID do was force the British to keep major navals units in home waters much longer than otherwise necessary...and they did do so. Name a single assembled convoy that did NOT sail from the Americas because of a threat from Norway.

Yes fast small convoys navigated the channel, very few large warships or cargo ships did. Null point.

No, the mistake is on your part in declaring that NO traffic could pass through the Channel.

British claim of sunk, ( not scuttled), German Destroyers. Claim backed up.

a British naval counter-attack by the old battleship HMS Warspite and a flotilla of destroyers over several days succeeded in sinking all ten German destroyers once they ran out of fuel and ammunition.

I asked you to prove your claim that British HISTORIANS said all ten were SCUTTLED....

and YOU replied with a TREBLE FAIL....

Wikipedia is not British;

There's nothing saying the entry was written by British HISORIANS;

You post up a period NEWSPAPER PAGE that CONFIRMS that seven German destroyers were sunk, not scuttled???

Well done. Seriously. If this is the best you can do when challenged on proofs...

As to not thinking of being at French coast in 1940 & MFP's, irrelevant, Norway & Black sea & Baltic were considered as potential landing sites well ahead of 1940. These same MFP's were then deplyed in Baltic during Barbarossa. & yes Norway had flat landing beaches in the southern part of the country.

Perhaps you should check out WHEN the construction of the MFPs was ordered...

Entirely familiar, there was a functional gravel runway at Melgerdes,

Out of range of Ju52s flying with ANY load from any existing field in Norway in 1940....

Today there are 90 runways there, 70 of them grass.

So? After seventy years of development of Icelandic aviation since 1940?

Plus the runway at Trodheim was completed in 3 weeks. You should read up on it.

The runway at Trondheim-Vaernes was extended in three weeks, and a jute matting surface laid over the grass - it was not constructed from scratch. Even according to your own source it took until 1942 for the new, extra concrete runways to be built. I believe you've been told this before, elsewhere...

Aug 1940.

This was followed by the Fairey Battles of No.98 Squadron Bomber Command....to operate from the makeshift grass field at Kaldadarnes...


On account of the Battles’ limited range the squadron was held up at Wick several weeks awaiting favourable weather for the crossing to Iceland and it was not until 27 August that the first section of 9 Battles led by W/Cdr. Ashton in L5343 took off for Iceland escorted by two Sunderlands. Five hours and twenty minutes later they all landed safely at Kaldadarnes, L5343 thereby allegedly becoming the first RAF aircraft to set its wheels on Icelandic soil.

In other words, it took at least three months to make the grass flightline at Kaldadarnes useable. And IIRC it was selected because at that point in time the runway at Reykjavik was boggy and not regularly useable.

on the 1st of DECEMBER...three months later..."Airfields were still under construction at Reykjavik and Kaldadarnes

EXACTLY.

And where do the men for airfield construction come from right?
Hitler ordered preliminary plans for Fall Ikarus in mid June of 1940. The troops projected to be used were the ones that were organized to relieve the Mountain Division at Narvik. Headquarters, 163rd Division was to be used with Mountain Troops (from 2nd Mountain, 4 battalions specially motorized), Motorcycle, Armor (one battalion of 13 Pz IIs and 34 Pz 38Ts), Mountain Artillery (12- 7.5 CM guns), Engineer troops (airfield construction, Port, and Line Companies), plus landing ferries. Four weeks provisions were to be carried

They can fight....or they can build runways; they certainly can't do BOTH at the same time.

P.S. airfield construction? Remember when the plans for IKARUS were begun; by this point, those LW personnel were busy elsewhere improving strips in Norway. Again - they can't work in two places at the same time...

Don't need to do both at the same time, combat troops fight, engineers build, along with laborers. Most labor in Norway was provided by Norwegians. Op Ikarus would bring the neccessary men for the task. 1 -2 strips doesn't require the entrire draining of all construction companies in Germany. Ridiculous.

Yes runways still under construction in December, yet used starting from August EXACTLY! They start with grass, then use gravel & ultimately cement. Doesn't mean they waited around not using strips til cement work completed. HELLO!





The runway at Trondheim-Vaernes was extended in three weeks, and a jute matting surface laid over the grass - it was not constructed from scratch. Even according to your own source it took until 1942 for the new, extra concrete runways to be built. I believe you've been told this before, elsewhere...

I believe you've been told elswhere this runway was used immediately for Narvik operations. They didn't wait til 42 to use em, you still get everything wrong after all this time. Amazing.


MFP's were ordered when Bob presented itself. No need to check.

JU 52's can also land on grass at Icelands east shore as you've been told before.

& you skipped the part where it was claimed 10 Destroyers sunk by British

a British naval counter-attack by the old battleship HMS Warspite and a flotilla of destroyers over several days succeeded in sinking all ten German destroyers once they ran out of fuel and ammunition.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Weser%C3%BCbung

Yes runways still under construction in December, yet used starting from August EXACTLY! They start with grass, then use gravel & ultimately cement. Doesn't mean they waited around not using strips til cement work completed. HELLO!

Yes, they used the mud strip at kaldadarnes for single-engined aircraft with difficulty - they couldn't use twin-engined aircraft like the Hudson until the runway was tarmac'd.

I believe you've been told elswhere this runway was used immediately for Narvik operations. They didn't wait til 42 to use em, you still get everything wrong after all this time. Amazing.

Yes - operations over Narvik with lighter combat aircraft, and Ju52s with light loads...

JU 52's can also land on grass at Icelands east shore as you've been told before.

Yes, you've claimed this umpteen times now - and when I can link externally I'll post up the pics YOU used to illustrate the kind of terrain YOU think they could land in...

My, how they'll laugh...

& you skipped the part where it was claimed 10 Destroyers sunk by British

I didn't need to worry about it - YOU posted up a contemporary secondary source that PROVED they only claimed seven!...contradicting your first post entirely.

I tend not to waste too much time on something when people contradict themselves for me! I put the time saved to better uses

Fairy Battles flew before the tarmac arrived. Fail. & Germans didn't fly Hudsons, fail again. 52's & Stukas designed for grass. Epic fail.

Ignore the 1st source yet again, still disproves your assertion.

I posted JU 52 photos in grass all over Europe, Icelandic grass ain't that much different. Fail again.

British sent troops to Melgerdi to cover landing grounds, why? distance from Trondheim to Melgerdi is 854 miles.
http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm?d&pt_1=isauakur&pt_2=

With extra fuel a Ju-52 is reported to be able to tow a DFS-230 more than 1,000 miles.
http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt08/gliders-gliderborne-troops.html




















The British were also worried that the Germans might airlift troops, as they had done with great success in their Norwegian Campaign. To guard against this, troops would drive east to the landing grounds at Sandskeið and Kaldaðarnes. Lastly, troops would be sent by land to the harbour at Akureyri and the landing ground at Melgerði in the north of the country.[13]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Iceland

Perhaps if we cover this terrain 10 more times, you'll begin to catch on, but probably not.

P.S....

I believe you've been told elswhere this runway was used immediately for Narvik operations. They didn't wait til 42 to use em, you still get everything wrong after all this time. Amazing.

Yes - operations over Narvik with lighter combat aircraft, and Ju52s with light loads...

Would this be the runway at Trondheim-Vaernes where -

...Adverse weather conditions, which precluded all but a few transports taking off from the German base on the Norwegian airfield at Trondheim, made this perhaps the most hazardous operation of the whole campaign. And it took 12 days to get the whole battalion to its objective...

"German parastroops in World War II" Volkmar Kuhn.

Enemy action also prevented "Narvik operations" beginning "immediately" from Trondheim-Vaernes...

...while on 12 April came the war's first carrier-borne strike, by Swordfish from HMS Furious on Trondheim. This opened a two-day campaign against German air bases and shipping involving 161 sorties.

"Phoenix Triumphant" E.R Hooton.

After THAT - Trondheim was far too busy flying IN 600 transport sorties until 25th April to bring in 181.Infantrie Division to defend Trondheim against the British thrust there. Trondheim was so busy doing this, that the submarines UA and U101 had to run aviation spirit and biombs to Trondheim for the airfield! Vaernes was attacked by Ark Royal twice more at the end of the month....and it was to REPAIR DAMAGE from these attacks that the Luftwaffe drafted in local labour!

You see, what you seem to have missed is - most the the air transport operations to Narvik were carried out by 1./KG 40's FW200s and Foester's KGrzbV 108...flying Do26s and B&V flying boats from the PORT of Trondheim!

Something else you've missed - the vast majority of the Ju52 transport sorties flown to Narvik were actually by KGrzbV 102 from OSLO-FORNEBU! Vaernes was used for combat sorties to Narvik, principally by KG 26....

Fairy Battles flew before the tarmac arrived. Fail.

How much LESS does a single-engined Fairey Battle weigh than a fully-loaded Ju52? Shall we bring the embarassing figures to this forum too?

& Germans didn't fly Hudsons, fail again.

A straw man.

52's & Stukas designed for grass. Epic fail.

Landing on strips cleared, levelled and checked by Luftwaffe Airfield Maintenance Units...

I posted JU 52 photos in grass all over Europe, Icelandic grass ain't that much different. Fail again.

Indeed - pics of Ju52s on grass airfields - Icelandic field grass, with rocks, heights, hollows, fences???

British sent troops to Melgerdi to cover landing grounds, why? distance from Trondheim to Melgerdi is 854 miles.

Because the British feared flyingboat landings on the nearby lake, not Ju52s landing on the gravel strip! And of course to protect the RAF flyingboat base they opened at Akureyri.

With extra fuel a Ju-52 is reported to be able to tow a DFS-230 more than 1,000 miles.

....carrying no cargo load. And that means they drop into the sea on the way back to Norway.

They don't fly back to Norway empty. Why would you posit such silliness? They fly a 1 way mission to debark troops, they worry about refueling & flying back much later. Good gawd that was silly.

No fences, just plain old JU 52s operating on grass, you saw em.

No nearby lake, rather the landing grounds the link mentioned, please do read material as posted. Sandskeid, Kaldadarnes, & Melgerdi.

Sandskeið and Kaldaðarnes. Lastly, troops would be sent by land to the harbour at Akureyri and the landing ground at Melgerði in the north of the country.[13]

Good God, does a Fairy Battle weigh much more than a Stuka?

Fairy Battle
Empty weight: 6,647 lb (3,015 kg)
Loaded weight: 10,792 lb (4,895 kg)

Stuka
Empty weight: 3,205 kg (7,086 lb)
Loaded weight: 4,320 kg (9,524 lb)

Loaded weight is 1000 pounds more for Fairy Battle.






Even the 52 ain't that much diff.

Empty weight: 4,000 kg (8,830 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 7,000 kg (15,450 lb)

Empty only 8,830 which is what they'd be doing a Glider tow.


& for you to assert the Germans would deliberately seek fences & fields with rocks as suitable JU 52 landing sites is beyond belief. How anyone could take you seriously after such an assertion is well, unlikely.

They don't fly back to Norway empty. Why would you posit such silliness? They fly a 1 way mission to debark troops, they worry about refueling & flying back much later. Good gawd that was silly.

Wonderful idea....then they can't tug gliders, so why mention it at all?

P.S. as you were advised to over a year ago, have you bothered to read MacDonald on the problems the Germans had historically refuelling aircraft at makeshift airfields from drums of fuel?

No fences, just plain old JU 52s operating on grass, you saw em.

Yes, on prepared strips cleared, levelled and maintained by Luftwaffe Airfield Maintenance Units. There weren't any of these within Ju52 range in Eastern Iceland in 1940.

No nearby lake, rather the landing grounds the link mentioned, please do read material as posted. Sandskeid, Kaldadarnes, & Melgerdi.

I don't use Wikipedia as a reliable reference. There are FAR better references on the British occupation of iceland in 1940, most of which have been drawn to your attention previously and proved you wrong on a series of claims.

Good God, does a Fairy Battle weigh much more than a Stuka?

Fairy Battle
Empty weight: 6,647 lb (3,015 kg)
Loaded weight: 10,792 lb (4,895 kg)

Stuka
Empty weight: 3,205 kg (7,086 lb)
Loaded weight: 4,320 kg (9,524 lb)

Loaded weight is 1000 pounds more for Fairy Battle

Stukas can't reach Iceland under their own power, the ONLY way they get there is dismantled, by ship, and once the Germans happen (!) to have taken an Icelandic harbour with a quay to disembark them at. Then they have to be transported to where they can be assembled. And THEN they have to be assembled...

In other words - they can ONLY be landed at Reykjavik, and the port there, then transported by road IF the Germans also land suitable prime movers, then they have to be assembled at Sandskeid or Kaldadarnes, the only places suitable for landing grounds in the Southland.

In other words - if the Germans already occupy Southland...AND Reykjavik...why are they bothering to land close air support aircraft anyway???

& for you to assert the Germans would deliberately seek fences & fields with rocks as suitable JU 52 landing sites is beyond belief. How anyone could take you seriously after such an assertion is well, unlikely

I think you should at last find some period pics of Icelandic FARMLAND You're in for a big suprise...

Officially they can tug gliders, do you have a source for this assertion that JU 52's can't tug gliders? In the real world they actually did acccomplish it. Curious assertion.

I have sought mucho Icelandic farmland & historically a/c did fly around the country to prove its feasibility.


Stukas, actually passenger liners bremen & Europa both have 5 ton capacity cranes, Stuka empty in little more than 7000 pounds, so, no it could easily be done minus dissasembly.

Even the 52 ain't that much diff.

Empty weight: 4,000 kg (8,830 lb)
Max takeoff weight:

7,000 kg (15,450 lb)

And where did you get THOSE figures from?

From the Wiki entry for the Ju52/1...

Unfortunately for your argument....by thenstart of the war the Luftwaffe had gone long beyond the 52/1! By 1939 they were flying the Ju52/3mg3e and 4e variants...

Empty weight: 5,970 kg (13,180 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 9,210 kg (20,330 lb)

I'll be generous and presume it was simply an oversight that you cited figures that were two tons lighter!

& historically a/c did fly around the country to prove its feasibility..

Oh yes, by all means let's discuss THAT - and see how it shows up comparisons with landing fully-loaded Ju52s...

Before you do - careful of repeating any claims you made before and were ALREADY proved to be wrong...

Not fully laden as you mentioned either mostly empty with light loads or entirely empty from towing Gliders.





Empty weight: 4,000 kg (8,830 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 7,000 kg (15,450 lb)


Data from Wolfgang Wagner "Hugo Junkers Pionier der Luftfahrt - Seine Flugzeuge" Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn 1996 ISBN 3-7637-6112-8 (in German) p. 342

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ju_52

Stukas, actually passenger liners bremen & Europa both have 5 ton capacity cranes, Stuka empty in little more than 7000 pounds, so, no it could easily be done minus dissasembly

Aircraft weren't disassembled for transport by ship because of their weight!

It was because of their SIZE....

Perhaps you'd care to illustrate which cargo hatches on those liners would pass a complete Stuka? Perhaps you'd care to illustrate how many complete Stukas could be parked by crane on the decking of their cargo holds?

Plenty room on deck, cargo hatches? really. Especially if 3/4 of wings removed. do I have to explain everything to you?

Plus they even had higher weight load crane ships, B one could easily roll em after they are on the docks. Take part of the wings off & they could be rolled anywhere.