Max Manus: Part 2 of article

After being vetted at the Royal Victoria Patriotic School (known as ‘Sing-Sing’) in London, Manus was considered very quickly for special duties: Munthe had informed his superiors of Manus and London realised that they now had an absolute gem amongst their SOE men and Manus’ actions in Norway later on would confirm their beliefs in him.
Trained in the UK initially at Special Training School 3 (STS 3 Stodham Park, Hampshire) Manus was highly recommended to become an agent. However, early in 1942 there was alarm from the British security service as Manus had earlier stated, whilst at the Patriotic School, that he had been in communication with a medical student called Ramstad. This man was apparently associated with the illegal newspaper, ‘Vi Vill Oss Et Land’. Anxious checks quickly took place to ensure that Manus had not been talking to a known German agent, Lyden Ramstad who was living at 103 Dramænsveien, in Oslo. Fortunately, Manus had chosen his contacts carefully and his contact was loyal and genuine and not a spy for the Germans!
Manus quickly settled into his life as an SOE man and the following reports from Manus’ instructors gives us an insight as to the make-up of the man and how he coped with the demands of ‘Special Duties’ training:
The first report is from Sergeant (Sgt) Monsen – STS 24 (Inverie House & Glaschoille in Malliag, Scotland)

“This officer is as open as a book and cannot conceal his feelings. He is very much in love with a wealthy London widow, and she has more or less become an obsession. This man had a very trying experience in Norway. Apparently, he had been doing a lot of useful undercover sabotage and was eventually cornered by the Gestapo, and he escaped by jumping out of a second story window, probably this is the reason he has somewhat nervous spells. He is very keen and enthusiastic in everything he does. He speaks good English and Spanish”.
A further report was issued in February 42:

“As full of life and good spirits as ever, this officer simply doesn’t give a damn if it snows. He received a letter from his “wealthy widow” yesterday and was so pleased he showed it to everyone. He is very interested in everything that goes on, particularly in demolition. I am not too sure regarding his security, but will report on his reactions to the security lecture I am giving this week-end’.

The lady that so much filled Manus’ thoughts was a certain Mrs Olive Watchman of Flat B 11 Craven Hill, Paddington, London. The security services checked out Mrs Watchman and issued the following statement – “Mrs W is a shrewd business woman who might be without scruples in some things but is not likely to engage in any matter contrary to the security of this country” – D/CE – Security Section.

“Good type of officer, works hard, tough & energetic [and] plenty of command. Popular with all members of the party & would get a good following. Weapon training is his specialty. A leader.”

The reports continued and Manus was assessed by a variety of officers and men, although as can be seen not all the reports were favourable to the great man.
At Meoble Lodge, in Scotland (STS 23) it was reported that Manus ‘was a very enthusiastic and impetuous man, not always thorough enough. He shows great spirit and ingenuity in extricating himself from the tight corners in which his rashness leads him. Rather inclined to rush things, but is full of “guts”. [He is] most popular with everyone. [Manus is] full of ideas and goes to trouble of expounding them in practice. Would get a good following’

A rather mixed bag of comments came from his observing officer at STS 51 in March 1942 (Parachute school at Dunham House & Fulshaw Hall in Manchester). The officer is not named, but clearly Manus did not impress him.

“Worked hard and was fairly keen. Poor type of officer. No control over his men and generally was the leader in all horse-play. Jumped fairly well with no nerves. Missed his door drop owing to bad weather. Made three descents.”

At STS 33 (Finishing School – The House on the Shore – Beaulieu) the observing officer took a different, if elitist view:

“Very alert and intelligent although handicapped by a certain lack of education. He has the confidence born or experience and is clearly very resourceful. He should make an excellent leader among men of his own kind. Captain Dehn reports very well of him and considers that his outlook, intelligence and previous experience qualify him very highly for Captain Hackett’s school for which he strongly recommends him.”

Consequently, the report from Captain Hackett at STS 26 (Propaganda training at Aviemore, Scotland) states: “showed great common sense and worked very hard with enthusiasm and interest. In practical matters has reached a good average. Background is not such as to make it reasonable to expect him to be good at the planning and creation of propaganda. In relation to background his work was very good. [He] would make a good organiser, provided the team under him included a good writer and planner.”

It didn’t take the British and Norwegian authorities long to make a decision on Manus and soon he was back in Norway on a designated operation with his good friend, Gregers Gram. The following is a report given after the operation

‘Military Cross awarded for his work on Operation Mardonius – It was Manus’ idea to sabotage shipping in Oslo Harbour using specially constructed charges placed on the sides of ships from canoes. On 12th March 1943 Manus and Gregers Gram parachuted in to Norway, but almost immediately disaster struck as Manus was struck down by a bout of pneumonia, which nearly killed him. Difficulties also arose in getting loyal Norwegians to assist with the attack despite Gram making hazardous trips into Oslo to recruit. However, Manus recovered and on 28th April Manus and Gram pressed home their attack resulting in the sinking of two ships and a third damaged. The conditions were not favourable as it was a light night and the canoes gave off very distinctive phosphorescence which would have indicated to any alert guard that a craft of some description was in the area. To compound matters extremely bright dockyard lights flooded the harbour making any seaborne attack very difficult. However, notwithstanding all these problems Manus and Gram carried out their operation successfully and returned to the UK with valuable information.’

The report is typically understated and does not reflect the extreme lengths and difficulties that Manus, Gram and the other volunteers, Sigurd Jacobsen, Halvor Haddeland and Einar Riis-Johansen went through. It is fair to conclude, though, that the awards were very well deserved and hard earned.
From a British perspective there was a difference of opinion as to the award of the MC to Gregers Gram. Although he was a corporal, on this particular operation he was promoted temporarily to Fenrik. However, because he was not fully commissioned and because the rank was relinquished upon his return to the UK the award of Military Medal was deemed appropriate.
The recommendation for the awards to Max Manus and Gregers Gram all came from the Colonel in charge of Norwegian Section SOE – John Skinner Wilson.
For the Distinguished Service Order the following, more explicit, report was made:

‘Manus planned and carried out the operation which saw the sinking of the ship ‘Donau’ approx 9,000tons and the damaging of the ‘Rolandseck’ of approx 2000 tons. It was not a straight forward operation as the limpet mines, the rubber boat and other equipment had to be concealed first on a wharf in Oslo harbour that was used for the embarkation of German troops. This in itself was a hazardous operation, but the shear audacity of Manus’ methods saw him through. Brazen use was made of a well of a lift which led from the deck of the wharf to the lower platform whereby the equipment could be stowed. To get through the guard entrance at the dock a decoy vehicle was used with the occupant creating a nuisance of himself with the guards. The second vehicle, with Manus and packed with all the equipment was then waved through…the ruse had worked. But to Manus’ chagrin the wharf was full of Germans. However, fortune favours the brave and with great daring, and in full view of the Germans, the equipment was unloaded close to the lift. The car was then driven out of the dock. Later, when the wharf was clear of Germans, the equipment was stowed away in the lift and taken down to the lower section. Manus was aided by two loyal Norwegian workers.
The plan was to attack a large, heavy transport ship, but Manus had to wait some days until a suitable target presented itself. On the 15th January the ‘Donau’ arrived from Aarhus and Manus made the decision to attack her (NB. The ‘Donau’ had previously been used to transport Jews from Norway to Germany whereby many of them were taken to Auschwitz where their lives were sadly and cruelly taken).
Early next morning, Manus, with a helper met with his dock contact, but the man was not at all optimistic. The water surrounding the wharf was full of floating ice, a German soldier had recently fallen in and a search was in progress and finally a number of horses had been tied off to the door entrance which led to the lift. Manus decided to carry on.
Manus and his companion, Roy Nielsen dressed in full British battle-dress with over 100 metres of cordtex tied around their waists, but all concealed under boiler suits, approached the dock guard and proceeded to take part in a comic sketch to aid them through the gate…Nielsen ‘slipped’ on the icy ground, much to the amusement of the guard…it worked, though, and they were through, despite a cursory inspection of their papers. Once again the sheer audacity and bravery of the Norwegians had come to the fore. However, the atmosphere was still tense as the guards that were posted on the wharf to protect the ‘Donau’ regularly aimed their rifles and shot in to the water at anything that was suspicious. Fortunately, the horses had been embarked and the door was clear to enter. The lift was positioned so that the two men could slip underneath it. Looking through a small chink they could see Germans approaching, but all the Germans wanted to do was to get out off the wind. There was at least 8 degrees of frost and it was exceptionally cold in the biting wind. After a while the Germans moved on and Manus’ contact on the docks carefully locked the door.
A rope ladder was let down amongst the wharf timbers but soon the rungs were full of ice: the rubber dingy was also lowered and blown up to the covering tune of a German sergeant drilling an unfortunate squad. Eleven limpet mines were care fully loaded in to the dingy along with two Sten guns, ammunition and grenades in case they had to fight their way out of any trouble. The two men removed their boiler suits and stepped into the dingy in preparation to pushing off. However, a German patrol boat pulled up alongside the wharf and began a searching amongst the timbers. Manus and Nielsen laid low in their boat daring not to breathe, but the Germans were not the most observant and soon left. After a suitable period waiting for the all clear the intrepid duo pushed off. The going was tough as they inched their way forward through the ice using oars and an axe. Navigating carefully alongside the ‘Donau’ they placed their limpets aft of the engine room. With all the limpet mines in place they made their way back to the wharf, but then noticed the ‘Rolandseck’ arriving on the other side of the wharf. Manus knew this was too good an opportunity to miss. Despite both men being soaked through and very cold, they fetched the one remaining limpet from their improvised store. The German patrol boat returned once again, but as before it failed to spot the armed Norwegians and once it had moved off the duo paddled their way alongside the ‘Rolandseck’ and planted their limpet on its side. During this operation the ‘Donau’ left its mooring moving into open water with two tugs attending alongside. This meant that light now streamed under the wharf making it even more hazardous for the men as they returned, but to their relief nothing untoward happened and they made it safely back to their timbered shelter. The dingy was disposed off by knifing and the men once more donned their boiler suits. Suddenly, the sound heavy steps approached the door way and then men stood ready with their Sten guns cocked for action, but to their immense relief it was their contact who had come to open the door. The men stepped out on to the wharf and made their way past the guard at the dock entrance who again laughed at Nielsen’s unfortunate earlier ‘accident’. Manus and Nielsen stepped aboard a tram and made their way home.
At 22:00hrs the ‘Donau’ was in the sound just off Drøbak having just dropped off her pilot. The Captain had just increased speed when the explosion occurred. The Captain attempted to beach the ship and ran her ashore at full speed with crew jumping off in all directions. Despite the beaching the ship settled at the stern and sunk in 25 metre of water’.

The report does not state how many of the 1500 Alpine troops were lost, but some unconfirmed reports stated that 300 horses were almost certainly lost as well as a substantial amount of motorised transport. German Command in Oslo was immediately informed and steps were taken to ensure that ‘Rolandseck’ was checked for mines. She was taken off the wharf and her sides scraped, but the Germans were not thorough and at 02:00hrs on the 17th the limpet exploded. Emergency pumps were already in place on the ship and their task to keep the ship afloat began in earnest with the result that all the troops and their equipment was saved.
Manus and Nielsen’s operation had been a success. The men had displayed immense bravery, cunning and patience as well as a grim determination to see the operation through.
It wasn’t all success for Manus, though. He made several attempts on enemy shipping without success and on at least one occasion was shot at by alert sentries. But although Manus’ greatest successes were on the water he also worked closely with the ‘Oslo Gang’ led by the redoubtable Gunnar Sønsteby taking part in actions against the labour records as well as ‘removing’ a Gestapo official who was being transferred to Denmark. He also assisted with the attacks on German aircraft under repair at the Oslo Tramway depot as well as on the Norsk Vacuum Oil Storage depot at Sørenga. In this raid Manus was suffering from a recent bullet wound which had entered his knee and passed out through his thigh and then lodged against his breastbone. However, despite the severe discomfort he drove the incendiary packed lorry into the oil depot as ordered. For this action he was highly praised for his courage, particularly as he had to avoid a German military patrol just prior to the action.
For many Gunnar Sønsteby is seen as the archetypal Norwegian resistance fighter, but Max Manus can be considered as one of the most resourceful men that fought for the freedom of Norway; his exploits against enemy shipping in Oslo Fjord demonstrated bravery, grim determination and stamina of immeasurable proportions and those exploits and qualities have never been surpassed and hopefully never will be.
Operational Missions: – Mardonius, Bundle & Derby
Awarded Norwegian War Cross with swords, Military Cross (MC) and bar and Distinguished Service Order (DSO).

Sources: National Archives – London. Ref: HS9/986/2:
‘SOE in Scandinavia’ by Charles Cruickshank (OUP 1986):
Inside SOE’ by E H Cookridge (Barker 1966)
‘Underwater Saboteur’ by Max Manus (Kimber 1954) Bob Pearson 2008

Thank you Bob for a most interesting article. Pity though that the filmmakers did so poor research. Otherwise they could have made a point of the officers in Englands' observations of him.

Hello!
Interesting reading, you have worked quite a bit with this!!

A few comments:

- His fathers name was Johan Magnussen, which he later changed to "Juan Manus".
- Max´s Uncle, Erling, called himself Colonel Earl McManus. Ran quite shady businesses in Cuba. (one of Max´s working tasks, was watering out Rhum and guiding sailors to a brothel)
- This with "Fought really hard" in Finland is not quite true. Better to just write: "Volunteered for service in Finland".
- "The report does not state how many of the 1500 Alpine troops were lost"
No, because none were lost. 3 men were injured.

One link about Cuba, sadly only in Norwegian (actually "New-Norwegian"): http://www.ssb.no/ssp/utg/9905/4.shtml
and the German report from "Donau". Snatched from Simon (Click the links to enlargen)

B.

http://www.bilder-hochladen.net/files/3v25-r-jpg.html][/url]

In Bob Pearsons two articles we have witnessed one of the greatest historical scoops about Norway and WWII.



When Pearson contacted the National Archives (Public Records Office) he just got a short statement: "Max Manus' form is under lock and key. No access will be given when Manus is alive"


This means that no persons or bodies - other than what eventually Government bodies (I.e. Military Intelligence) - has been given access to his form after WWII.



Pearson managed to get a qualified statement about Manus' demise and was given access to his form. He travelled to London and photographed every item in his file.



One set for him and his work, and one set for "Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum"!



The form gives a wide insight to Manus' complex nature. The form states that he was judged very much different from different people. They also give light to the fact why Gregers Gram got “just” the Military Medal, and Manus the Military Cross, being just a humble corporal as Gram was, Manus being an officer.



Robert Pearson gives credit to the phrase: "Hands across the ocean"



Especially now with the panegyric tribute to Manus, it is vital to get information about the "whole person - Manus" not just the saboteur.

Keep up the good work Bob.

The same article as above - In Norwegian

I Bob Pearsons to artikler har vi fått innsikt i et av de største historiske "scoop" om Norge og 2. verdenskrig.

Da Bob Pearson kontaktet det engelske Nasjonalarkivet, var den korte beskjeden: "Rullebladet til Max Manus er sperret for adgang. Ingen adgang vil bli gitt mens han er i live."

Dette betyr at ingen personer eller organer - andre enn ev statlige organer (les Militær sikkerhetstjeneste) har blitt gitt tilgang til rullebladet hans etter 2. verdenskrig.

Pearson klarte å få en bekreftelese om Manus' død som Nasjonalarkivet godtok og fikk tilgang til rullebladet. Han reiste til London og fotograferte alt i rullebladet/mappen.

Ett sett for seg selv og ett sett for Norges Hjemmefrontsmuseum.

Rullebladet gir en vid innsikt i Manus' komplekse natur. Rullebladet viser at forskjellige personer vurderte han svært ulikt. Det gir også innsikt i hvorfor Gregers Gram "bare" fikk Military Medal og Manus Military Cross. Årsaken var at Gram bare var en beskjeden korporal og Manus en offiser.

Robert Pearson gir kredit til setningen "Hands accross the ocean"

Spesielt nå, med den panegyriske hyllingen av Manus er det særdeles viktig å få informasjon om den "hele personen" Manus - ikke bare sabotøren.

Hold fram som du stemner, Bob!

Siden Max tydeligvis var offiser, betyr det at han var en britisk soldat/agent på oppdrag i Norge (i sivilt) eller var han en motstandsmann ?
Dvs norsk motstandsmann eller britisk agent/soldat ? Og hva er da forskjellen på en motstandsmann / kvinne og gutta på skauen. Eller er dette detaljer som vi helst ikke skal gå nærmere inn på ?

Olve

Jeg tror det kan oppsummeres slik:

Man visste vilke rettigheter det medfører å være soldat. Jf Genevekonvensjonen. Genevekonvensjonen tillater faktisk at man opptrer i sivil, tom i fiendens uniform under opphold, forflytning osv - dvs som ledd i en krigslist. Genevekonvensjonen tillater likevel ikke at man KJEMPER i sivil eller i fiendeuniform. Dette må skje i uniform eller med kjennetegn som sidestilles med uniform.

Hjemmefronten kom til at fordelen med å opptre i sivil "hele veien" ga en så stor fordel at man tok konsekvensen ved å bli henrettet som "franktirør" dersom man ble tatt.

Max Manus levde i Oslo i sivil. Han opptrådte som oftest i uniform under oppdrag. Dette er ikke i strid med Genevekonvensjonen/Folkeretten. Ble han under en aksjon tatt til fange i uniform, var han i utgangspunktet under beskyttelse av Genevekonvensjonen/Folkeretten.

Jeg skrev "som oftest". I noen aksjoner, "aksjonerte" han i sivil og var dermed pr definisjon Franktirør og nøt under disse aksjonene ikke godt av beskyttelse som Genevekonvensjonen / Folkeretten gav.

Irreggulars, Franktirører osv. Genevekonvensjonen tillater faktisk at en Franktirør blir henrettet dersom en slik dom er i samsvar med okkupantens lovverk og rettsaken skjer i anerkjente former.

Dette medførte at ingen tysker eller tysk organisasjon ble gjort ansvarlig for dødsdommer idømt nordmenn tatt i sivil under sabotasjeoppdrag. De ble likevel i en del tilfeller dømt for tortur under forhørene, da tortur var i strid med folkeretten.

Jf og så at Von Falkenhorst ble dømt til døden grunnet at han bla. a. gav ordre til henrettelse av engelske soldater i uniform fanget på norsk jord. Dette var i strid med Genevekonvensjonen og Folkeretten.

Til orientering, sakset fra min egen, kommende artikkel om Falkenhorst:

After the war he was imprisoned and sentenced to death by the British Military Court. They claimed that he was responsible for the executions of Norwegian and British commando soldiers from MTB 345 30.june 1943 (Norwegian article).
For unknown reasons, the court changed the sentence to 20 years imprisonment. He was released 13. July 1953 because of bad health.
He died 18. June 1968 in Holzminden.


Kurt Monsen

Jeg skrev med vilje "dømt til døden" og ikke "henrettet". Ja,

"On all other charges the defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to death. His sentence was, however, commuted to one of life imprisonment."

Anklagene, bevisførselen osv. kan leses her:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/falkenhorst.htm

Max Manus did not fight hard in Finland. Most of the time training. Just a few days of combat. After the peace of 13th March 1940 the Swedish Voluntary Corps (SFK) in Finland, which also counted some 800 Norwegians, was slowly demobilized. On 9th April the unit Max Manus belonged to had just arrived in Haparanda, far north in Sweden. Some 130 volunteers travelled with train to Stockholm and from there to Carlottenberg on the Norwegian-Swedish border.

On 14th April the volunteers arrived in Kongsvinger. They formed a Company under command of Captain Gösta Benckert who was a Swedish volunteer ex-SFK. Max Manus was promoted 2/Lt and commanding 1st Platoon. On 16th April 1940 he fought at Kongsvinger.

Max Manus belonged to the part of Company Benckert which was cut off from the Norwegian forces at Kongsvinger. Under command of Captain Benckert the Company counting some 90 men fought guerilla warfare and reached Röros area on 3rd May 1940. There the majority of the Company was sent home. Captain Benckert moved north with 20 men and reached Selbu on 12th June 1940. Learning that Norway had surrendered Captain Benckert and some of his men crossed into Sweden on 18th June 1940.

Company Benckert had then travelled 886 km of which 473 km marching by foot.

Max Manus said regarding Captain Benckert: "He was a good soldier ant the most fearless man I have met. We owe him many thanks". (Max Manus, Det ordnar sig alltid, Stockholm 1957, page 14).

There is an ongoing debate between Norwegian historians regarding Max Manus participating in combat in Finland.

I beleive that Max Manus served in 1st Rifle Coy (Cpt Nils Bouveng) of II.Group (Reinforced Bn) SFK. But I have not got it confirmed yet. The other unit with Norwegian volunteers was 3rd Rifle Coy (1Lt Karl-Henrik Bergh) of I.Group SFK.

The reason for beleiving that Max Manus was in 1st Rifle Coy II.Group is that 2Lt (in Norway Cpt) Gösta Benckert was CO 3rd Platoon in that Coy.

Anyhow 1st Coy II.Group arrived to Salla front 27th February 1940. The major Soviet attack was carried out on Sunday 10th March 1940. It started 14H15 and lasted to 18H30. In the beginning only the HMG Squad was in action but 1500 two Rifle Squads from 1st Coy were comitted into action and by 17H30 the whole 1st Coy was engaged.

The following day 46 dead Russians were found and traces in the snow showed that the Soviets had evacuated a large number of wounded.
The volunteer Knut Friang wrote: "Again and again we hear the deadly wounded crying for their comrades in the night. It is horrible, horrible. But there is nothing we can do. We cannot go out and look for wounded in the night. That should serve no purpose."

It is known that the cries from dying and wounded Russians during the night had a great inpact on the nerves of the Scandinavian volunteers. After the 10th March fighting 1st Coy II.Group was not in contact with the enemy. The Winter War ended on 13th March 1940.